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INTRODUCTION 
I am both honored and saddened to have this opportunity to 
remember Laura Chisolm and her pioneering work on advocacy by 
tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations. What set Laura’s work apart was 
her identification of the fundamental policy concerns driving the 
federal tax law’s restrictions on advocacy and her exposure of how 
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those restrictions were not always consistent with such concerns.1 
With this Article, I plan to take a similar approach to the much more 
modest topic of disclosure obligations for tax-exempt nonprofits 
engaged in political activity. 
The political involvement of tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, 
which often do not disclose their financial supporters, has become a 
topic of national interest.2 While such involvement is nothing new, 
the Supreme Court’s recent Citizens United decision and the resulting 
focus on the flows of corporate, union, and wealthy individuals’ funds 
into election-related activities has brought this involvement to the fore 
of the public’s consciousness.3 This increased attention has led to 
growing calls to publicly expose the financial dealings of politically 
involved nonprofit organizations, including the identities of their 
donors.4 
                                                                                                                 
1 See, e.g., Laura B. Chisolm, Exempt Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the 
Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201, 207 (1987) (“The underlying principles can and should be 
identified; the law can and should be designed to reflect them.”); Laura Brown Chisolm, Politics 
and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexistence, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 315 (1990) 
(“[A]s currently formulated and applied, the section 501(c)(3) absolute prohibition on campaign 
intervention is constitutionally questionable, incongruent with campaign finance regulation, 
inconsistent with the premises underlying the charitable tax exemption, and contrary to free 
speech values.”). 
2 See, e.g., Dave Helling, Campaign Maneuver Lets Donors Stay Secret, KANSAS CITY 
STAR, Apr. 24, 2010, at A1 (observing that “[a] maneuver not uncommon in other parts of the 
nation—using a nonprofit group to influence elections while keeping its donors secret—has 
landed in Missouri's judicial battle with a good-sized splash”); Mike McIntire, Under Tax-
Exempt Cloak, Political Dollars Flow, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, at A1 (covering political 
nonprofit’s funding of attack ads without disclosure of financing or close ties to a Republican 
consulting operation); Paul Blumenthal, Super PACs And Secret Money: The Unregulated 
Shadow Campaign, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 26, 2011, 10:40 AM, updated Sept. 27, 2011, 
12:49 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/26/super-pacs-secret-money-campaign-
finance_n_977699.html (recounting rise of independent campaign organizations receiving 
unlimited and undisclosed contributions as part of a “sea change” in the federal campaign 
finance system following the Supreme Court of the United States’ Decision in Citizens United 
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)). See generally ERIKA LUNDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL33377, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: POLITICAL ACTIVITY RESTRICTIONS AND 
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 25–27 (2007) (summarizing the current disclosure rules applicable 
to such organizations). 
3 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (“The Government may 
regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may 
not suppress that speech altogether.”). See generally Richard Briffault, Nonprofits and 
Disclosure in the Wake of Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 337 (2011); Outside Spending, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/index.php (last visited Jan. 11, 
2012) (providing outside spending data for elections since 1990 broken down by political 
affiliation, type of expenditure, degree of disclosure, organization, and electoral race). 
4 See, e.g., Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act, 
H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. §§ 211, 301 (2010) [hereinafter House DISCLOSE Act] (as passed by 
House on June 24, 2010) (amending Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to add additional 
disclosure requirements); Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections 
Act, S. 3295, 111th Cong. §§ 211, 301 (2010) [hereinafter Senate DISCLOSE Act] (as 
introduced in Senate on Apr. 30, 2010) (same); Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech 
of Noncharitable Exempt Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363, 401–05 
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The time is therefore ripe for a deeper consideration of the policy 
concerns that underlie such public disclosure requirements and the 
related issue of privacy. To clarify the discussion, one aspect for 
deeper consideration is recognizing that this particular area is at the 
intersection of three significantly different disclosure regimes. Those 
three regimes are (1) federal tax law generally, (2) federal tax law as 
it applies to tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, and (3) federal 
election law.5 These regimes are a study in contrasts. Federal tax law 
strongly protects taxpayer information from public disclosure. And 
while federal tax exemption law strongly favors public disclosure of 
institutional information, it is more ambivalent about public 
disclosure of information relating to individuals. In contrast, federal 
election law strongly favors public disclosure of all relevant financial 
information, including information relating to individuals. 
Understanding the reasons for these differences is important to 
determine whether disclosures at the intersection of the three regimes 
are appropriate and desirable. 
The other, related aspect of this deeper consideration is privacy. 
The concept of privacy is one that is instantly recognizable and yet 
theoretically, much less legally, hard to define.6 This difficulty stems 
in part from the many possible applications of the privacy concept. 
Fortunately for the purposes of this Article, the context here is fairly 
clear and narrow: the public disclosure of information relating to 
nonprofit organizations involved in politics and their supporters. Even 
in this narrow context, however, there are at least two competing 
approaches with respect to privacy. One takes a cost-benefit 
approach. It judges disclosure requirements based on their 
                                                                                                                 
 
(2011) (proposing, among other things, disclosure of contributors and taxing politicking by non-
charitable tax-exempt organizations whether or not they have net investment income); Donald 
B. Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to the Regulatory 
Plumbing, 10 ELECTION L.J. 427, 439–47 (2011) (proposing that the Treasury issue regulations 
to quickly reduce the manipulation of tax-exempt status, but preferring legislative action); Ciara 
Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, the Dark Election of 2010 and Why Tax-Exempt 
Entities Should be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, 16 NEXUS 
CHAP. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 89–91 (2010) (arguing that the absence of disclosure requirements 
for contributions to section 501(c)(6) trade associations potentially damages corporate 
shareholder value and opens the door to foreign-owned corporation campaign expenditures); 
David Callahan, Op-Ed., Bring Donors Out of the Shadows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2011, at A21 
(arguing for public disclosure of contributions to political nonprofits). 
5 Similar regimes exist at the state level, but discussion of the state tax and election laws 
governing disclosure is beyond the scope of this article. See THE CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE 
PROJECT, http://www.campaigndisclosure.org (last updated Sept. 20, 2008) (providing overview 
of state election laws relating to disclosure). 
6 See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of privacy in the 
law). 
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quantifiable costs and benefits, including among those costs the harm 
to privacy, however measured. The other, less frequently used, is a 
right-to-privacy approach that considers privacy a fundamental right 
that can only be abridged if there is a relatively strong interest for 
doing so and then only to the extent required to further that interest. 
The first Part of this Article briefly reviews and contrasts the 
history and current rules governing disclosure and privacy in the 
federal tax, federal tax exemption, and federal election law contexts. 
This review reveals that both the cost-benefit approach and the right-
to-privacy approach can be found in this history, but to a greater or 
lesser extent depending on the context. The second Part explores 
these two different approaches and the extent to which the existing 
disclosure rules reflect those approaches. This Part shows that the 
rules are sometimes but not always based both on the cost-benefit 
approach to disclosure, in which privacy harms are but one possible 
cost, and on the right-to-privacy approach. The third Part considers 
recent proposals for disclosure rules relating to nonprofit 
organizations engaged in political activity using both the cost-benefit 
approach and the right-to-privacy approach. This consideration 
reveals that certain proposals, which relate to disclosure of financial 
information primarily about the organizations themselves, generally 
are justifiable under either approach. Certain other proposals that 
would require disclosure of financial information primarily relating to 
individuals, however, are more difficult to justify under a right-to-
privacy approach. I conclude by discussing why this difference exists 
and what it means for the desirability of disclosure in this area. 
I. THREE DIFFERENT DISCLOSURE REGIMES  
A tax-exempt nonprofit organization that engages in political 
activities is potentially at the intersection of three significantly 
different federal law disclosure regimes. Each of the regimes requires 
the organization to disclose detailed financial information to the 
government, including to a lesser or greater extent information about 
other parties with which the organization has financial dealings. 
While the exact financial information that must be disclosed varies, 
the primary difference between them is whether the financial 
information that is disclosed to the government is also revealed to the 
public. This Part explores that aspect of each disclosure regime and 
the apparent reasons why public disclosure is not always required. 
First, however, a brief explanation is needed regarding how this 
intersection came to be. As I have detailed elsewhere, federal election 
law requires public disclosure of financial information by entities 
 2/13/2012 3:37:51 PM 
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engaged in certain types of political (i.e., candidate supporting or 
opposing) activity; these entities include candidate committees, 
political parties, and political committees (i.e., PACs), and the 
publicly disclosed information includes identifying information for 
donors of any significant size.7 To accommodate these entities in the 
federal income tax system, Congress also created a separate 
exemption category for organizations engaged in “political activities” 
under Internal Revenue Code section 527 that have as their primary 
activity supporting or opposing candidates.8 Because “political 
activity” as defined by federal tax law is broader than the “political 
activity” regulated by federal election law, it proved possible to create 
“527 organizations” that were not covered by election law’s 
disclosure rules, which subsequently became known as “stealth 
PACs.”9 To correct this gap in required public disclosures, Congress 
amended federal tax law in 2000 to impose disclosure requirements 
on these stealth organizations that essentially paralleled the election 
law disclosure rules, including the public disclosure of information 
identifying donors of any significant size.10  
Under existing federal tax law, however, it is also possible for 
other types of tax-exempt organizations to engage in many types of 
political activity without becoming subject to either set of disclosure 
rules as long as that political activity does not become the primary 
activity of the organization.11 These tax-exempt organizations include 
section 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, section 501(c)(5) labor 
unions, and section 501(c)(6) trade associations and chambers of 
commerce. While this ability has existed for many years, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Citizens United appears to have triggered both a 
new attention to it and a new flow of funds into these politically 
active tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, with the sources of those 
funds generally not subject to public disclosure.12 This new attention 
and new funds have led commentators and politicians to call for 
                                                                                                                 
7 Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV. 
625, 633–34 (2007) (discussing the limits that federal election law places on contributions to 
certain entities); id. at 636–37 (discussing the disclosure rules). 
8 Id. at 639–40. 
9 Id. at 645.  
10 Id. at 646. 
11 See Aprill, supra note 4, at 381–87 (discussing which nonprofit organizations are able 
to engage in political activity as long as it does not become their primary activity); Tobin, supra 
note 4, at 429–31(same). In contrast to these non-charitable, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, 
charitable nonprofit organizations that are tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) are not permitted 
to engage in any political activity (i.e., any support or opposition of candidates). See I.R.C. § 
501(c)(3) (2006) (“[A]nd which does not participate in, or intervene in . . . any political 
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”). 
12 See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the Citizens United 
decision). 
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increased disclosure of information, including information relating to 
donors, about these organizations that sit at the intersection of the 
disclosure rules found in federal tax law, federal tax exemption law, 
and federal election law.13 
A. Federal Tax Law Generally 
The Treasury Department has broad authority to require taxpayers 
to provide detailed financial information that would help the 
government collect tax revenues.14 The primary vehicle for providing 
this information is the myriad of forms and schedules prepared by the 
IRS and completed by taxpayers, a universe of paperwork that 
continues to grow both as Treasury identifies additional information 
that would aid in tax collection and as Congress enacts additional 
reporting laws.15 The Treasury Department also has the ability to 
require taxpayers to keep extensive records that the IRS may demand 
on audit, as well as to ask for relevant information from third 
parties.16 
At the same time, however, the Internal Revenue Code sharply 
limits the extent to which the IRS can share the information it 
receives from taxpayers with not only the public, but even with other 
governments and other federal government agencies. More 
specifically, Internal Revenue Code section 6103 provides a general 
rule that “[r]eturns and return information shall be confidential.”17 A 
                                                                                                                 
13 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (citing proposed bills and other commentary 
that would require greater disclosure). 
14 See I.R.C. § 6001 (“Every person liable for any tax imposed by this title . . . shall . . . 
render such statements [and] make such returns” as the Treasury Department may prescribe); 
I.R.C. § 6011(a) (requiring any person liable for tax to provide whatever information may be 
required by forms or regulations prescribed by the Treasury Department). 
15 See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Tax Returns—Confidentiality vs. Public 
Disclosure, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 479, 482 (1981) (“The history of the federal income tax 
indicates the list of items [taxpayers must disclose to the IRS] will not shrink in the foreseeable 
future; but, if anything, will grow longer.”); see also Forms and Instructions (PDF), INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE, http://www.irs.gov/app/picklist/list/formsInstructions.html (last visited Jan. 
11, 2012) (listing 1,183 IRS forms and instructions for forms). 
16 See I.R.C. § 6001 (requiring the keeping of records); I.R.C. § 7602(a) (authorizing the 
examination of any records and the taking of any testimony relevant to determining liability for 
federal tax). 
17 I.R.C. § 6103(a). While prior to amendment of this statute in 1976 tax records were in 
theory public records, in practice executive orders and other executive branch rules generally 
protected tax information from public but not intra-government disclosure. See I STAFF OF JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY 
AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3802 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998, at 127 (2000) [hereinafter JCT REPORT 
vol. I] (arguing need for tax return confidentiality is demonstrated by privacy breaches during 
the Watergate era); S. REP. NO. 94–938, at 315–16 (1976) (outlining public record status of 
income tax returns law prior to Tax Reform Act of 1976); 1 OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, SCOPE AND USE OF TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS 20–21 (2000) 
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“return” is defined broadly as “any tax or information return, 
declaration of estimated tax, or claim for refund . . . .”18 Similarly, 
“return information” includes essentially all financial information 
relating to a taxpayer.19 This confidentiality provision is backed by 
both civil and criminal penalties not only on government employees 
who make unauthorized disclosures, but also on other persons who re-
publish information received through an unauthorized disclosure.20 
There are a variety of exceptions to this general rule, primarily 
with respect to sharing information with certain other federal 
government agencies, such as the Social Security Administration, and 
with state tax agencies.21 Public disclosure of returns or return 
information, other than in an aggregate form, is generally prohibited 
except for a narrow exception relating to obtaining needed 
information from third parties and for when a taxpayer chooses to 
contest a tax liability in court.22 IRS materials confirm the importance 
of maintaining the confidentiality of this information. For example, 
one publication states that the Internal Revenue Code “makes the 
                                                                                                                 
 
[hereinafter TREASURY REPORT] (detailing relationship between two executive orders issued by 
President Nixon and Congressional concern over tax privacy); T. Keith Fogg, Transparency in 
Private Collection of Federal Taxes, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 763, 770–71 (2011) (describing history 
of federal tax disclosure); David Lenter, Douglas Shackelford & Joel Slemrod, Public 
Disclosure of Corporate Tax Return Information: Accounting, Economics, and Legal 
Perspectives, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 803, 813 (2003) (reviewing development of confidentiality 
rules); Paul Schwartz, The Future of Tax Privacy, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 883, 885–86 (2008) 
(describing judicial, executive, and legislative roles in defining historical extent of tax privacy). 
18 I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1). 
19 I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2). 
20 See I.R.C. § 7213 (making unauthorized disclosure of return or return information, 
including republication of such information by any person when the disclosure was not 
permitted, a felony); I.R.C. § 7431 (imposing civil liability on the United States for prohibited 
disclosures or, if the prohibited disclosure is by a person who is not an employee of the United 
States, the person making the disclosure); see generally JCT REPORT vol. I, supra note 17, at 
56–58 (discussing the imposition of criminal and civil liability for unauthorized disclosure); 
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 17, at 25–26 (same). 
21 I.R.C. § 6103(d)–(l) (2006 & Supp. III 2009 & Supp. IV 2010); see also JCT REPORT 
vol. I, supra note 17, at 27–55 (discussing permissible disclosures by IRS); TREASURY REPORT, 
supra note 17, at 42–66 (same); James N. Benedict & Leslie A. Lupert, Federal Income Tax 
Returns: The Tension Between Government Access and Confidentiality, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 
940, 964–982 (1979) (discussing various government officials’ access to confidential tax return 
information). 
22 I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4) (providing for disclosures in judicial proceedings); id. at (k)(6) 
(providing for disclosures for investigative purposes); see also Bittker, supra note 15, at 490–91 
(noting that while “taxpayers who wish to litigate their tax liabilities must open the relevant 
facts to judicial, and hence to public, inspection,” disclosure of taxpayer information to 
members of the general public is generally not permitted). For a discussion of some of the 
emerging disclosure issues relating to tax information, see Christopher S. Rizek, Taxpayer 
Privacy and Disclosure Issues Will Continue to Touch Us All, in TAX NOTES: 30TH 
ANNIVERSARY EDITION 81 (2002). 
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confidential relationship between the taxpayer and the IRS quite 
clear.”23 
A 2000 Joint Committee on Taxation staff report that 
comprehensively reviewed the disclosure provisions in the federal tax 
laws summarized the policy reasons for these rules: “This 
confidentiality is based on persons’ right to privacy, as well as the 
view that voluntary compliance will be increased if taxpayers know 
that the information they provide to the government will not become 
public.”24 That is, these rules exist both to protect privacy as a right 
enjoyed by taxpayers and for pragmatic reasons relating to 
maximizing the collection of tax revenues owed. The report goes on 
to detail reasons why the narrow exceptions summarized above 
exist.25 In fact, the Joint Committee on Taxation staff strongly 
recommended against granting any additional access to returns or 
return information absent a “compelling need for the disclosure that 
clearly outweighs the privacy interests of the taxpayer.”26 
B. Federal Tax Law for Tax-Exempt Organizations 
Federal tax law also governs the disclosure of financial and other 
information provided to the IRS by organizations exempt from federal 
income tax.27 In contrast to the general disclosure rules, the rules for 
tax-exempt organizations’ information strongly favor public 
disclosure, except in relatively limited circumstances. While tax-
exempt organizations have not always had to disclose financial 
information—and some are still not required to do so—once they 
were forced to provide it to the IRS, the information also became 
subject to mandatory public disclosure.28 
                                                                                                                 
23 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX INFORMATION SECURITY GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL, 
STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES (PUB. 1075), at 12 (2010). 
24 JCT REPORT vol. I, supra note 17, at 5; see also id. at 127–28 (noting that a degree of 
confidentiality is necessary for effective tax law); TREASURY REPORT, supra note 17, at 33 
(explaining how reasonable and continuing expectation of privacy is central to taxpayer 
concerns). 
25 See JCT REPORT vol. I, supra note 17, at 129–32 (detailing certain exceptions to 
general rule of confidentiality); supra note 22 and accompanying text (noting that public 
disclosure of returns or return information is not permitted except in relatively narrow 
circumstances). 
26 JCT REPORT vol. I, supra note 17, at 6; see also id. at 196–97 (discussing the Joint 
Committee on Taxation staff’s recommendation regarding disclosure of returns or return 
information). 
27 See generally Susan L. Paul & Bill Brockner, Disclosure, FOIA and the Privacy Act, in 
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS-TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 2003 (2002), available 
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicc03.pdf (discussing application of privacy laws to the 
IRS by governmental agencies). 
28 See II JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106th Cong., STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW TAXPAYER 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3802 OF THE 
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Tax-exempt organizations provide information to the IRS 
primarily through two channels. First, some organizations provide 
information when seeking IRS recognition of their tax-exempt 
status—a requirement for most charitable organizations other than 
churches and certain church-related entities, but an option for other 
types of tax-exempt organizations.29 The information on those 
organizations’ application forms and related submissions are available 
to the public.30 Initially that availability was only through the IRS, but 
more recently Congress chose to require the organizations themselves 
to provide access to these documents upon request.31 
The other channel is the annual information return that almost all 
tax-exempt organizations—the major exception again being churches 
and certain church-related entities—have to file with the IRS.32 The 
amount of information that organizations need to provide on some 
version of the IRS Form 990 varies depending on the financial size of 
the organization, but in general the information on whatever return is 
filed is available to the public.33 As with the application, the return 
initially was only available from the IRS, but more recently Congress 
chose to require organizations themselves to provide copies of recent 
returns upon request.34 This information is also now widely available 
because of a private organization that made arrangements with the 
IRS to obtain electronic copies of all annual information returns and 
post them on the Internet.35 Congress has even extended public 
disclosure to the annual form tax-exempt organizations use to report 
taxable income from trades or business conducted but that are 
unrelated to the purpose that provides the basis for the organizations’ 
tax-exempt status.36 
                                                                                                                 
 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998, at 124 (2000) 
[hereinafter JCT REPORT vol. II] (discussing the historical context of the reporting requirements 
and obligations of tax-exempt organizations); Fogg, supra note 17, at 799–800 (explaining the 
basis for requiring reporting by tax-exempt organizations). 
29 See I.R.C. § 508(a), (c) (2006) (requiring new organizations to notify the Secretary of 
tax-exempt registration unless they are a church). 
30 See I.R.C. § 6104(a)(1)(A), (d)(1)(A)(iii) (2006) (making applications for tax-exempt 
organizations available to public inspection at the IRS). 
31 See I.R.C. § 6104(d)(1)(A)(iii), (d)(1)(B) (outlining the classes of organizations that 
must make tax-exemption documents available upon request). 
32 I.R.C. § 6033(a)(1), (a)(3).  
33 See I.R.C. § 6104(b), (d)(1)(A)(i) (providing for inspection of the annual returns). 
34 I.R.C. § 6104(d)(1)(A)(i). 
35 See GUIDESTAR, http://www2.guidestar.org (last visited Jan. 11, 2012) (providing 
information about tax-exempt organizations including annual reports). 
36 See I.R.C. § 6104(d)(1)(A)(ii) (requiring disclosure of all returns filed under section 
6011 by 501(c)(3) organization).  
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While the information provided by tax-exempt organizations to the 
IRS is generally subject to public disclosure, there are some 
exceptions. Probably the most significant exception relates to 
information that identifies an organization’s donors. The Internal 
Revenue Code requires most tax-exempt organizations to disclose 
some identifying information regarding contributors to the IRS, but 
the IRS is not authorized to disclose that information to the public nor 
are the organizations themselves required to provide that information 
to the public; the only organizations for which this limitation on 
public disclosure does not apply are private foundations and political 
organizations.37 Private foundations are generally charitable 
organizations that initially are funded by a single donor or a small 
group of often related donors and are usually controlled by that donor 
or the donor’s family members.38 The public disclosure of the donors’ 
identities is one part of a larger set of provisions designed to limit the 
influence of donors to private foundations based on Congress’s 
perception that these entities were particularly susceptible to abuse 
through misuse of their charitable assets by their financial 
supporters.39 Political organizations are groups that primarily seek to 
influence the election of candidates.40 Requiring disclosure of their 
even relatively modest contributors is based on the reasons discussed 
in Part I.C that support public disclosure of contributors to candidates, 
political parties, and political committees.41  
Three other more limited exceptions to the public disclosure of 
information provided to the IRS on an application or annual 
information return also exist. One is an exception for identifying 
information for individual—but not organizational or government—
grant recipients.42 Another is an exception for information that would 
                                                                                                                 
37 I.R.C. § 6104(b), (d)(3)(A). 
38 See I.R.C. § 509(a) (defining a private foundation). 
39 See I.R.C. §§ 4940–4946 (2006 & Supp. I) (imposing various taxes on private 
foundations for actions that are inconsistent with the foundations charitable purpose). See 
generally Thomas A. Troyer, The 1969 Private Foundation Law: Historical Perspective on Its 
Origins and Underpinnings, 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 52 (2000) (recounting the history of 
abuse of charitable and other tax-exempt organizations). 
40 See I.R.C. § 527(e)(1)–(2) (defining a political organization and an exempt function); 
see also supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text (discussing “political” organizations).  
41 See Fogg, supra note 17, at 803 (information disclosure with respect to political 
organizations is “more to benefit campaign finance law than to promote tax disclosure”); see 
generally Mayer, supra note 7, at 637–48 (explaining the justification for and treatment of 
political activity by tax-exempt organizations).  
42 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 990 SCHEDULE I GRANTS AND OTHER 
ASSISTANCE TO ORGANIZATIONS, GOVERNMENTS, AND INDIVIDUALS IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990si.pdf (showing Part II as relating to 
organization and government grant recipients requires identifying information, while Part III 
relating to individual grant recipients does not). 
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reveal trade secrets or information which could adversely affect the 
national defense.43 Finally, an organization can refuse to provide 
copies of information upon request if the organization can 
demonstrate it is the subject of a harassment campaign and that 
compliance with the request is not in the public interest.44 This 
exception does not, however, prevent the party seeking the 
information from obtaining it through other means, including through 
public inspection of documents at the organization’s offices.45 
Outside of these narrow exceptions, and the broader exception for 
identifying information for donors, the information provided by tax-
exempt organizations on these forms is otherwise accessible to the 
public. 
That said, certain other information relating to tax-exempt 
nonprofit organizations is not subject to public disclosure. While 
private letter rulings, technical advice memoranda, and other tax 
documents relating to specific organizations are publicly available, 
identifying information is redacted from the public copies of such 
documents, as is the case for all taxpayers.46 Similarly, the progress 
and results of examinations with respect to specific tax-exempt 
nonprofit organizations is not publicly available or even available to 
an individual or organization that filed a complaint with the IRS that 
may have triggered the examination.47 The one exception is if the 
examination results in revocation of the organization’s tax-exempt 
status, in which case the fact of the revocation is publicly 
announced.48 These limits on public disclosure appear, however, to 
represent simply an application of the general bias toward 
confidentiality in the federal tax laws as opposed to a conscious 
decision by Congress or the Treasury to protect the confidentiality of 
such information for tax-exempt nonprofits.49 
                                                                                                                 
43 I.R.C. § 6104(a)(1)(D), (d)(3)(B). 
44 I.R.C. § 6104(d)(4). 
45 See id. (applying only to the provision of copies upon request). 
46 See I.R.C. § 6110(c) (detailing the personal information that must be deleted before the 
Treasury Secretary makes a disclosure); JCT REPORT vol. II, supra note 28, at 37–41 
(explaining the disclosure and privacy protections codified in section 6110(c)); TREASURY 
REPORT, supra note 17, at 27 (explaining section 6110 redaction policies and how to challenge 
the redactions); Fogg, supra note 17, at 775–76 (explaining the history of the disclosure 
provision). 
47 See JCT REPORT vol. II, supra note 28, at 84–85 (“Present law does not provide for the 
disclosure of information relating to the audit of a tax-exempt organization.”). 
48 See Rev. Proc. 82–39, 1982–2 C.B. 759, § 3.01 (providing that if “the Service 
subsequently revokes a ruling or a determination letter previously issued to it, contributions 
made to the organization by persons unaware of the change in the status of the organization 
generally will be considered allowable if made on or before the date of an appropriate public 
announcement”). 
49 See JCT REPORT vol. II, supra note 28, at 40–41, 83–85 (noting several exceptions to 
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The Joint Committee on Taxation staff’s 2000 report mentioned 
previously also discussed the disclosure rules applicable to tax-
exempt organizations.50 The report recognized that tax-exempt 
organizations have a right to privacy.51 The committee’s staff 
concluded, however, that the public’s interests in ensuring that 
organizations receiving significant tax benefits in fact qualified for 
those benefits and in having access to information about potential 
recipients of their donations generally outweighed this right.52 
Consistent with that conclusion, the Joint Committee on Taxation’s 
staff recommended greater public disclosure of information about tax-
exempt organizations, including information relating to all written 
determinations and closing agreements that resolve audits.53 The 
report’s conclusion regarding disclosure in this context is striking in 
its contrast to the Joint Committee on Taxation staff’s above-quoted 
statement relating to taxpayer information more generally: “The Joint 
Committee staff believes that disclosure of information regarding tax-
exempt organizations is appropriate unless there are compelling 
reasons for nondisclosure that clearly outweigh the public interest in 
disclosure.”54 
C. Federal Election Law 
Money has been an essential element in politics since time 
immemorial. At the same time, the possibility of money granting 
improper influence over government decisions and particularly over 
who governs has also been a perennial concern. One of the primary 
tools for addressing this concern in the United States has been 
required disclosure of the financial supporters of candidates, parties, 
and other political organizations to both the government and the 
public. The effect of such disclosure on those supporters is to reveal 
information about both their finances—at least with respect to how 
much they can afford to spend on political contributions—and their 
political views. 
Current law requires disclosure of detailed identifying information 
regarding those who provide financial support to others that engage in 
                                                                                                                 
 
the section 6110 framework that prevent disclosure but recommending that the present law be 
revised with respect to tax-exempt organizations to provide for more disclosure). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 5, 62. 
52 Id. at 5–6, 63. 
53 Id. at 7, 83–86. 
54 Id. at 80. For the committee’s more general view on taxpayer information, see supra 
note 24 and accompanying text.  
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politics, such others including candidates, entities, and individuals 
that engage in politics themselves.55 Relatively small contributions or 
expenditures trigger such disclosure, even at the federal level—
amounts as low as $201 in some situations.56 Thanks to technological 
advances, it is now relatively easy to access this information, whether 
through the Federal Election Commission’s database57 or through 
private databases that provide access to the same information.58 
The reasons for this disclosure are commonly stated in pure cost-
benefit terms—whether the benefits of such knowledge to the 
political process and to the public outweigh the costs to those whose 
information is disclosed.59 This may be in part because that is how the 
constitutional debate over such provisions is framed. The Supreme 
Court has stated that the constitutional standard is “exacting 
scrutiny,” which requires a “sufficiently important governmental 
interest” with which the disclosure requirement has a “substantial 
relation.”60 Once one or more particular governmental interests have 
been identified as sufficiently important, however, the Court appears 
to have essentially weighed the benefits from that interest or interests 
being furthered against the costs of disclosure to the affected parties.61 
Even Justice Thomas, who is the most skeptical member of the Court 
with respect to the constitutional viability of disclosure requirements, 
based his argument on what he believes is a more accurate view of the 
costs of disclosure than the other Justices acknowledge, rather than on 
a fundamental right to privacy.62 
                                                                                                                 
55 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2006) (providing reporting requirements for political 
committees).  
56 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(4), (b)(3)(A), (b)(5)(A), (c)(2)(C), (f)(2)(C) (requiring the disclosure 
of names and addresses of all individuals who donate over $200 in certain situations). 
57 Disclosure Data Search, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, 
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/disclosure_data_search.shtml (last visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
58 E.g., Huffpost Fundrace, HUFFINGTON POST, http://fundrace.huffingtonpost.com (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2012). 
59 See infra note 61 and accompanying text (providing examples of this balancing done by 
the Supreme Court). 
60 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted); see also Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010) (collecting cases); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (laying out the constitutional standard affirmed in 
Citizens United). 
61 See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914–17 (discussing and rejecting the arguments 
offered by Citizens United, which argued that the disclosure rules were unconstitutional as 
applied to it); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196–98 (2003) (citing the district court’s opinion 
weighing the competing First Amendment interests); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67–68, 71–72 (noting 
that the Court must look to the “extent of the burden that [disclosure requirements] place on 
individual rights”); see also infra notes 106–107 and accompanying text (further developing this 
point). 
62 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 980–82 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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In most instances that weighing has tilted toward disclosure, even 
though the evidence of both benefits and costs is relatively thin.63 In 
some specific instances, however, the costs to a particular group have 
been well enough established, or the benefits to the public are so 
ephemeral, that the courts conclude disclosure is constitutionally 
barred. For example, the Socialist Workers Party successfully 
litigated and then renewed an exemption from disclosure based on 
documented harassment of its members and supporters—i.e., 
significant costs.64 Margaret McIntyre, who distributed anonymous 
leaflets that opposed a local tax, successfully defended her anonymity 
in part because the benefits in terms of increased information to 
voters were minimal given her relative obscurity.65 
Even critics of most campaign finance restrictions, who primarily 
rely on a relatively strong and absolutist reading of the First 
Amendment’s free speech clause, have usually been willing to 
support disclosure as the preferable (and constitutional) means of 
combating corruption and the appearance of corruption in elections 
based on essentially a cost-benefit analysis.66 Moreover, there is an 
argument that because the effect of disclosure is in large part to 
publicly identify the political leanings of the persons subject to 
disclosure, there is no real privacy interest to protect since revealing a 
contributor’s leanings is simply “civic courage.” And so presumably 
the individual involved does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.67 But some commentators have flagged the fact that the 
extensive disclosure requirements in this area of law are inconsistent 
with a right to privacy that would require more than a balancing of 
measurable costs and benefits to justify disclosure.68 Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                                 
63 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 270, 280 
(2010) (arguing neither the voter information benefits nor the retaliation and fear of retaliation 
costs have strong evidentiary support). 
64 See Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 88 (1982) (finding 
a reasonable probability that the disclosure provisions of an Ohio law would subject the 
taxpayer to harassment); FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, ADVISORY OPINION 2009–01, at 1, 10–
11 (2009), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao (renewing the Socialist Worker’s 
Party’s exemption from disclosure rules based on the probability of harassment). 
65 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 348–49 (1995). 
66 See, e.g., STEPHANIE D. MOUSSALLI, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: THE CASE FOR 
DEREGULATION 20–21 (1990) (arguing disclosure laws can be justified by the benefits of 
greater voter information); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 
UTAH L. REV. 311, 326–27 (arguing that mandatory disclosure of contributors to political 
campaigns supported by democratic accountability benefits outweigh any inhibition of speech or 
other costs). 
67 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 09–
559) (Scalia, J.) (commenting on disclosure in the context of ballot initiative petition signers). 
68 See, e.g., William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Checkbook: Privacy Costs of Political 
Contribution Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 19–20 (2003) [hereinafter McGeveran, 
Checkbook] (arguing that “[f]orced revelations are intrusions into a sphere of personal liberty”); 
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both the constitutional and policy discussions have been dominated to 
date by such a balancing approach. 
The different bases and underlying policy reasons for the 
disclosure rules in these three contexts intersect at one question: to 
what extent should politically active, tax-exempt nonprofit 
organizations be required to disclose both their political activities and 
the identities of their financial supporters. How to answer this 
question depends, therefore, to a large extent on whether this context 
is viewed more as one that is election-related, where disclosure is 
strongly favored; tax-related, where disclosure is strongly disfavored; 
or nonprofit-related, where disclosure relating to the nonprofit itself is 
strongly favored but disclosure relating to other parties, particularly 
individuals, is viewed with more ambivalence.  
More fundamentally, the above analysis of the reasons for these 
different disclosure rules reveals two distinct approaches to disclosure 
and privacy. One approach, dominant in the general tax law context 
and almost invisible in the election law context, is that privacy is an 
intrinsic right that can only be infringed upon by public disclosure of 
otherwise private information in the most compelling of situations. 
The other approach, found in all three contexts but especially 
dominant in the election law context, is that what matters is a 
balancing of concrete costs and benefits in which privacy harm is 
only one cost (and a difficult to measure and generally minimized one 
at that). Part II examines these two different approaches more 
carefully, drawing on the broader privacy scholarship. 
II. TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO PRIVACY 
The issue of privacy has caused significant confusion in legal 
scholarship.69 On one hand, scholars for the most part agree with the 
general intuition that there is a right to privacy distinct from other 
                                                                                                                 
 
William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Persona: Bringing Privacy Theory to Election Law, 19 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 859, 861 (2011) [hereinafter McGeveran, Persona] (arguing that 
“the interest in anonymous political participation should not be anchored only in effects-
oriented reasoning that demands a danger of imminent physical or financial harm”); Bradley A. 
Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 
YALE L.J. 1049, 1071 n.139 (1996) (noting that disclosure laws raise “serious First Amendment 
questions”). 
69 See, e.g., HILARY DELANY & EOIN CAROLAN, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: A DOCTRINAL 
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ix (2008) (acknowledging “the essential elusiveness of the right 
to privacy”); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1 (2008) (“Privacy, however, is a 
concept in disarray. Nobody can articulate what it means.”); David Lindsay, An Exploration of 
the Conceptual Basis of Privacy and the Implications for the Future of Australian Privacy Law, 
29 MELB. U. L. REV. 131, 135 (2005) (“The concept of privacy . . . . is an ‘elusive’ concept that 
is difficult to define in a satisfactory manner.”). 
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legal rights, a right which the law should recognize and protect.70 On 
the other hand, scholars have struggled to develop a coherent theory 
regarding the extent of this right and how strongly the law should 
protect it.71 In large part, this struggle can be traced to the fact that the 
idea of “privacy” applies in many different contexts and in many 
different ways.72 
But there are some universal privacy concepts. One set of such 
concepts is the difference between a cost-benefit approach and a 
right-to-privacy approach.73 As this Part details, the former approach 
is characterized by an attempt to compare the resulting costs and 
benefits from infringing privacy. The latter perspective is 
characterized by privacy as a right that is fundamental to individuals 
and so can only be infringed upon if there are sufficiently important 
reasons for doing so. 
Full consideration of these two different approaches would be a 
mammoth task. Fortunately, the context to which these approaches 
apply is relatively limited, and so the discussion of them can be 
                                                                                                                 
70 See, e.g., BEATE RÖSSLER, THE VALUE OF PRIVACY 67–68 (R.D.V. Glasgow trans., 
Polity Press 2005) (2001) (rejecting reductionist approaches to privacy); Ruth Gavison, Privacy 
and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980) (arguing that “privacy is indeed a distinct 
and coherent concept”); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 236 
(1977) (relying on “two purportedly shared intuitions—one normative and the other descriptive: 
first, that we have some common commitment to the value of what is private in our lives; and, 
second, that we have some common conception of what in our lives in fact is private”); Lindsay, 
supra note 69, at 144–45 (rejecting reductionist approaches to privacy). But see Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295, 312–13 (1975) (arguing that privacy 
is a cluster of other rights as opposed to a coherent right in itself). Historically, the legal right to 
privacy is generally traced to an 1890 law review article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. 
Brandeis. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890). For examples of scholars tracing the right to privacy to Warren and Brandeis’s 
article, see SOLOVE, supra note 69, at 15; Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A 
Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703 (1990); Lindsay, supra note 69, 
at 140.  
71 See SOLOVE, supra note 6969, at 1 (“Philosophers, legal theorists, and jurists have 
frequently lamented the great difficulty in reaching a satisfying conception of privacy.”); 
Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 
371, 371 (2003) (“The meaning of privacy . . . has proven elusive.”). 
72 See, e.g., ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW AND SOCIETY 4–5 (2d ed. 2011) (listing six 
different senses in which privacy is discussed legally); RÖSSLER, supra note 70, at 6–7 
(describing three uses of privacy; relating to action and conduct, to certain knowledge, and to 
spaces, as well as five groups of definitions of the word “privacy”); Kahn, supra note 71, at 409 
(“Attempts to classify and define the right to privacy are . . . defeated by the underlying needs to 
diversity [sic] and split the concept so as to make it less broad.”); see generally SOLOVE, supra 
note 69, at 8–11 (proposing a “taxonomy of privacy,” which consists of four principal groups). 
73 See generally DELANY & CAROLAN, supra note 69, at 12–16 (contrasting 
consequentialist and deontological theories of privacy); Ronald A. Cass, Privacy and Legal 
Rights, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 867, 868–69, 871–72 (1991) (contrasting a deontological 
approach to privacy with a case-by-case intuitive approach that tends to draw on a cost-benefits 
analysis); Lindsay, supra note 69, at 144 (arguing that if privacy is accepted as a coherent 
concept, there is then a distinction between consequentialist and deontological approaches to 
privacy). 
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similarly limited.74 More specifically in the context here, what is 
private is financial information, and particularly financial information 
that tends to reveal (imperfectly) both the financial status of certain 
entities and individuals and their political leanings.75 Furthermore, the 
infringement on privacy is with respect to disclosure to the public, as 
disclosure to the government is already a given in this context. 
A. A Cost-Benefit Approach to Privacy 
One common approach to privacy is the well-known practice of 
comparing the measurable benefits of the relevant action against the 
measurable costs of that action. In the privacy context, the baseline or 
neutral state is when privacy is maintained while the action or change 
at issue is infringing on that privacy through disclosure. Difficulties 
with quantifying the benefits and costs of disclosure, however, often 
complicate the use of this approach. 
1. In Theory 
Turning to the baseline first, in the privacy context the baseline is 
generally the state of affairs absent legally compelled disclosure. 
Relevant, therefore, is whether the information at stake is already 
known to more people than the individual or entity making the 
privacy claim, including whether that information is already in some 
sense public.76 The baseline can, however, instead be a particular 
level of compelled disclosure that is taken as a given, with the 
infringing action being a broader level of disclosure whether with 
respect to what is disclosed or to whom disclosure is made.77 
Benefits can vary from the highly concrete to the highly 
speculative. Common benefits cited from compelled disclosure 
include more informed decision making by those receiving the 
otherwise private information, prevention or deterrence of specific 
harms, and enhanced enforcement of other laws.78 In many 
                                                                                                                 
74 This Article, therefore, ignores the many privacy applications and issues that arise in 
other contexts. See generally SOLOVE, supra note 69, at 101–70 (discussing privacy issues in 
the context of four different conceptions of privacy). 
75 See ALLEN, supra note 72, at 4 (discussing “informational” intrusions as one form of 
privacy invasion); RÖSSLER, supra note 70, at 9 (same). 
76 See SOLOVE, supra note 69, at 22 (noting that if privacy is viewed, as it is in a variety 
of legal contexts, as secrecy, that “often leads to the conclusion that once a fact is publicly 
divulged . . . it can no longer remain private”). 
77 See DELANY & CAROLAN, supra note 699, at 24–25 (arguing that an all-or-nothing 
approach to the right to privacy is an “analytical mis-step”); SOLOVE, supra note 69, at 23 (“The 
privacy-as-secrecy conception fails to recognize that individuals want to keep things private 
from some people but not others.”). 
78 See ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF 
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circumstances there are limited data quantifying such benefits, 
thereby requiring reliance on educated guesses and intuition to 
determine a sense of the benefits’ magnitude.79 
As for costs, these can also vary significantly. A common cost of 
compelled disclosure includes actions by those to whom information 
was disclosed, such as retaliation or harassment, which negatively 
impact the individual or entity subject to disclosure. Other costs are 
the related “chilling” effect on the activities or choices of the 
individual or entity subject to disclosure and reduced transparency or 
honesty in the disclosure, both of which harm the individual, entity, 
or society more generally.80 As with benefits, quantifying such costs 
is often quite challenging.81 
Because both benefits and costs can be difficult to quantify, the 
final, balancing step of the analysis can in many cases be suspect as a 
“garbage in, garbage out” situation. Yet sometimes a clear result—
favoring or disfavoring disclosure—can be reached because even 
given some uncertainty the overall balance is clear. In many other 
situations, however, the result is less clear. And the question arises of 
whether privacy or disclosure should be the default result in the face 
of such uncertainty. 
2. In Practice 
In all three of the contexts at issue here the disclosure decision has 
been based at least in part on a cost-benefit approach. But that 
approach has resulted in three very different results. In the general tax 
context, it has tended to reinforce a right-to-privacy conclusion that 
privacy should be favored over disclosure. In the tax-exempt 
nonprofit context, it is the second step of analysis after the conclusion 
has been reached, based on more fundamental concerns, that 
disclosure should be favored over privacy. That second step becomes 
the basis for the limited exceptions from otherwise required 
disclosure. Finally, in the election law context the cost-benefit 
approach has been the primary and indeed usually the only approach 
                                                                                                                 
 
TRANSPARENCY 6 (2007) (describing the informed decision making and reducing risks benefits 
of disclosure). 
79 See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 69, at 87–88 (discussing how the benefits and costs of 
privacy can be difficult to quantify); Mayer, supra note 633, at 256–57 (finding such flaws in 
the election law disclosure context). 
80 See SOLOVE, supra note 699, at 79–80, 88 (listing the benefits of privacy that could be 
harmed by disclosure). 
81 See supra note 79 (citing commentators who argue that the costs and benefits of privacy 
are hard to quantify). 
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taken, leading to a strong bias toward disclosure because the benefits 
have generally been considered significantly greater than the costs 
except in very limited situations. 
With respect to the general tax rules, the baseline for consideration 
of costs and benefits has in recent times been disclosure to the IRS 
but not beyond (even to other government agencies).82 The reason for 
accepting this baseline is relatively clear—without disclosure of 
taxpayer financial information to the IRS, whether from taxpayers 
directly or from third parties, underpayment of taxes owed would 
almost certainly be rampant and substantial. This assumption is 
supported not only by common sense, but by the fact that such 
underpayment is still a significant problem where third-party 
verification of taxpayer submitted information is not available.83 
Absent general IRS access to taxpayer financial information, 
underpayment would almost certainly become an enormous problem. 
So given the existence of a federal income tax system, disclosure of 
taxpayer financial information to the government is necessary for that 
system to function. 
Working from that baseline, consideration of benefits and costs of 
disclosing taxpayer information publicly has generally been limited to 
the effect of disclosure on the primary goal of the federal tax 
system—raising revenues for the federal government consistent with 
the existing tax laws.84 Focusing on this goal, the only cost-benefit 
question that Congress and commentators have tended to ask is 
whether such disclosure would enhance or inhibit the collection of the 
correct amount of revenues.85  
                                                                                                                 
82 See JCT REPORT vol. I, supra note 17, at 256 (providing the historical backdrop to the 
Tax Reform Act of 1976, which made tax return information confidential); Marc Linder, Tax 
Glasnost’ for Millionaires: Peeking Behind the Veil of Ignorance Along the Publicity-Privacy 
Continuum, 18 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 951, 966 (1991) (noting that the Tax Reform 
Act of 1976 codified the prohibition of disclosure to the general public, but did not reverse the 
trend toward intragovernmental disclosure); Robert P. Strauss, State Disclosure of Tax Return 
Information: Taxpayer Privacy Versus the Public’s Right to Know, 5 ST. TAX NOTES 24, 26 
(1993) (discussing the considerations that influenced Congress’ decision in the Tax Reform Act 
of 1976). 
83 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO–06–208T, TAX GAP: MULTIPLE 
STRATEGIES, BETTER COMPLIANCE DATA, AND LONG-TERM GOALS ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE 
TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 6 (2005) (showing that the misreporting of income is greatest in areas 
with little or no third party reporting). 
84 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 822, at 28 (discussing the efficacy of state disclosure laws 
in terms of their propensity to encourage compliance with the tax laws). 
85 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 94–938, at 318 (1976) (regarding disclosure to other government 
agencies, the Senate Finance Committee “tried to balance the particular office or agency’s need 
for the information involved with the citizen’s right to privacy and the related impact of 
disclosure upon the continuation of compliance with our country’s voluntary assessment 
system”); Joshua D. Blank, What’s Wrong with Shaming Corporate Tax Abuse, 62 TAX L. REV. 
539, 590 (2009) (concluding that disclosure of corporate involvement in abusive tax shelters is 
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Their conclusion has generally been that such disclosure would 
inhibit the collection of the correct amount of revenues because the 
tax system is dependent on taxpayers accurately reporting their 
financial information on their tax returns, and such accuracy can only 
be partially verified through third-party information reporting and 
IRS audits.86 The reasoning is that if taxpayers knew the information 
they reported would be publicly available and so could be used by 
others—family members, employers, business partners, vendors, 
scam artists, etc.—in a manner that would disadvantage the taxpayers, 
they would be much less likely to report truthful information on their 
returns.87 There also may be a risk that such disclosure would actually 
reveal widespread noncompliance, with the perverse effect that 
compliance would decrease as taxpayers realize the ineffectiveness of 
government enforcement.88  
So while the reason for this conclusion can be traced to possible 
harm to taxpayers, it ultimately is based primarily not on the 
magnitude of that harm itself. Rather, the conclusion is instead rooted 
in the perceived magnitude of that harm’s effect on the collection of 
the correct amount of revenue. Similarly, proposals to publicly 
disclose tax information for corporations depend at least in part on 
whether doing so will enhance or inhibit the collection of the correct 
amount of revenue.89 While this issue is not the only one that is 
relevant to such proposals, it is a critical one.90 
                                                                                                                 
 
not advisable because it would not deter such involvement and would potentially adversely 
affect other aspects of tax compliance). 
86 See S. REP. NO. 94–938, at 317 (asking “the question of whether the public’s reaction to 
possible abuse of privacy would seriously impair the effectiveness of our country’s very 
successful voluntary assessment system which is the mainstay of the Federal tax system”); JCT 
REPORT vol. I, supra note 17, at 128 (noting that the degree of compliance is related to the 
degree of confidentiality of information provided to the IRS). 
87 See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 17, at 34 (providing examples of how disclosure of 
return information could result in under- and over-reporting of income).  
88 See Joshua D. Blank, In Defense of Tax Privacy, 61 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2011) 
(manuscript at 22) (noting that tax privacy allows the government to selectively release 
information about tax enforcement resulting in an inflated public perception of the 
government’s ability to ensure compliance with the tax laws, thereby increasing actual 
compliance); Schwartz, supra note 17, at 889–90 (presenting Italy as an example of when the 
government released information over the internet to support tax compliance but the opposite 
happened as people realized the government’s inability to enforce tax collection). 
89 See Lenter, Shackelford, & Slemrod, supra note 17, at 820–21, 827 (discussing 
proposals that would require the disclosure of corporate tax return information). 
90 Id. at 827; see also Fogg, supra note 17, at 809–10 (proposing public disclosure of 
information about taxes collected by private entities and held in trust for the government 
because such funds are held in public trust and because disclosure would improve tax 
collection). 
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In the tax-exempt nonprofit context the baseline is instead 
disclosure to both the IRS and the public. The reasons for the 
disclosure to the IRS aspect of the baseline are fairly obvious—absent 
detailed financial and activity reporting to the IRS, there would be a 
strong incentive to create purportedly tax-exempt nonprofits that did 
not in fact qualify for the exemption because the misclassification 
would only be exposed in the relatively rare event of an IRS audit. 
Interestingly, however, for many years nonprofits claiming exemption 
did not have to apply for such status (and non-charitable nonprofits 
still are not required to apply) or file annual returns documenting their 
continued eligibility for such status.91 Starting in the middle of the 
twentieth century, however, Congress realized the potential for abuse 
that this lack of filings created and gradually expanded the required 
disclosure to the IRS.92 Now most charities have to file such 
applications and most nonprofits claiming exemption have to file an 
annual information return, although the amount of information they 
are required to provide on the annual return varies depending on their 
financial size.93 The only major exception to both requirements is for 
churches and certain church-related entities.94 This exception 
presumably arises not from generic privacy concerns, but instead 
from concerns relating to First Amendment free exercise of religion 
and entanglement issues.  
For nonprofit organizations, the baseline is disclosure to the public 
because of the public’s interest in knowing whether organizations that 
claim tax benefits are in fact qualified.95 While usually not stated 
explicitly, a related rationale is that by claiming such benefits, 
nonprofit organizations are voluntarily choosing to allow the 
information they provide to the IRS to also be revealed to the 
public.96 It could be argued for organizations in existence at the time 
                                                                                                                 
91 See I.R.C. § 6033(a) (2006) (identifying which organizations must file annual returns); 
JCT REPORT vol. II, supra note 28, at 24 (outlining different organizations that do not have to 
apply for status claiming exemption or file annual returns under Tax Reform Act of 1969).  
92 See H.R. REP. NO. 91–418, pt. 1, at 36 (1969) (detailing the primary purpose of annual 
reporting requirements as ensuring enforcement of the tax laws, and finding that “more 
information is needed, on a more current basis, from more organizations”); id. at 38 (noting that 
the lack of required applications means “Congress and the [IRS] are handicapped in evaluating 
and administering existing law”); S. REP. NO. 91–552, at 52 (1969) (“[M]ore information is 
needed on a more current basis for more organizations . . . .”); id. at 54 (noting that the lack of 
required applications means “the [IRS] has been handicapped in evaluating and administering 
existing laws”). 
93 See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the information that 
is required to be on annual information returns. 
94 I.R.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A). 
95 See supra note 522, 92 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons that information 
about nonprofit organizations is disclosed to the public). 
96 See Nat’l Fed’n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1318 
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the disclosure rules went into effect that this is a false choice, as loss 
of the previously claimed tax benefits could have, in many cases, 
been financially devastating. But certainly new organizations are on 
notice of the now existing disclosure rules before they claim these 
benefits. The baseline of both IRS and public disclosure, therefore, 
makes particular sense for new entities, although it can be justified for 
all organizations claiming tax-exempt status. 
Working from this baseline, the primary role of cost-benefit 
analysis is not to reinforce the conclusion favoring disclosure that 
more fundamental considerations support, although it may do so.97 
Rather, the analysis is used primarily to identify situations in which 
an exception from the public disclosure rules should be granted 
because the benefits of permitting an exception outweigh its costs. In 
that role, however, the analysis also sometimes reinforces the support 
for exceptions that arguably are based on a fundamental right to 
privacy approach. 
For example, the general rule that information identifying donors 
is not subject to public disclosure reflects both of these strands. The 
vast majority of donors to tax-exempt nonprofits are individuals and 
revealing their identities would disclose both information about their 
financial resources and their charitable preferences that often are not 
otherwise publicly available.98 Doing so would therefore conflict with 
a fundamental (and individual) right to privacy, as described below. 
At the same time, this exception is also often justified because it has 
minimal costs in terms of reduced compliance with the requirements 
for tax exemption. And, conversely, it promotes the significant 
                                                                                                                 
 
(S.D. Ala. 2002) (relying on this argument to conclude that disclosure requirements relating to 
contributions to I.R.C. § 527 political organizations were constitutional), vacated on other 
grounds sub nom. Mobile Republican Assembly v. United States, 353 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 
2003). 
97 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO–05–561T, TAX-EXEMPT SECTOR: 
GOVERNANCE, TRANSPARENCY, AND OVERSIGHT ARE CRITICAL FOR MAINTAINING PUBLIC 
TRUST 12–13 (2005) (stating that “[public disclosure] can both enhance incentives for ethical 
and effective operations and support public oversight of tax-exempt entities”); Evelyn Brody, 
Sunshine and Shadows on Charity Governance: Public Disclosure of Forms 990 and IRS 
Determinations 3 (May 3, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.kentlaw.edu/faculty/speakers/docs/brody-disclosure-Sugarman.pdf (citing 
statements that public disclosure increases legal compliance). But see Dana Brakman Reiser, 
There Ought to Be a Law: The Disclosure Focus of Recent Legislative Proposals for Nonprofit 
Reform, 80 CHI. KENT L. REV. 559, 601–05 (2005) (expressing skepticism that increased public 
disclosure of nonprofit organization information will increase enforcement of legal obligations); 
Robert A. Britton, Note, Making Disclosure Regulation Work in the Nonprofit Sector, 2008 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 437, 448–49 (same with respect to legal compliance generally). 
98 See KENNARD T. WING ET AL., THE NONPROFIT ALMANAC 2008, at 78 (2008) 
(illustrating that in 2006, $223 billion of the $295 billion in private contributions to nonprofit 
organizations, or 75 percent, came from living individuals). 
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benefit of encouraging donations, which helps the donee organization 
and supports the purpose of the charitable contribution deduction, i.e., 
encouraging donations.99 Where the costs of such an exception are 
viewed as more substantial in terms of inhibiting compliance with the 
restrictions on tax-exempt organizations, however, such as is arguably 
the case with donors to private foundations or with respect to 
information regarding executive compensation, then the analysis tilts 
the other way and public disclosure applies.100 
Finally, in the election law context the baseline also is generally 
disclosure to the government (here the Federal Election Commission). 
Historically, this baseline has been justified by three important 
governmental interests: (1) knowing about financial contributions to 
candidates, political parties, and other political players to prevent 
corruption and the appearance of corruption; (2) knowing about 
financial contributions to enable the government to enforce the 
various limits on contributions and other political expenditures; and 
(3) informing voters.101  
The reasoning and result of the Citizens United decision, however, 
weakened the first two interests with respect to independent 
expenditures. The Court diluted the first interest by concluding that 
the government only had a compelling interest in preventing 
corruption via quid pro quo arrangements, which the Court further 
concluded was not a concern with respect to expenditures made 
independently of candidates and political parties.102 But as a policy 
matter the government could still have an interest, albeit a less than 
compelling one in the Court’s view, in monitoring independent 
expenditures and contributions to entities making such expenditures 
to prevent more broadly defined corruption.  
                                                                                                                 
99 See S. REP. NO. 91–552, at 53 (1969) (concluding that the underlying rationale in 
modifying the law is that publicly disclosing the identity of substantial contributors might 
prevent some gifts); JCT REPORT vol. II, supra note 28, at 81 (same). 
100 See H.R. REP. NO. 91–413, pt. 1, at 36 (1969) (stating that disclosure of information 
relating to substantial contributors, directors, trustees, other management officials, and highly 
compensated employees “is intended to facilitate meaningful enforcement of the limitations 
imposed by the bill, especially when combined with the publicity provisions”). 
101 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003) (noting that state interests for disclosure 
requirements include “providing the electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and 
avoiding any appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce more substantive 
electioneering restriction”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–68 (1976); Robert F. Bauer, Not 
Just a Private Matter: The Purposes of Disclosure in an Expanded Regulatory System, 6 
ELECTION L.J. 38, 38 (2007); Elizabeth Garrett, McConnell v. FEC and Disclosure, 3 ELECTION 
L.J. 237, 239 (2004); Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of 
Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 265, 270 
(2000). 
102 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909–10 (2010). 
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Citizens United also virtually eliminated the second interest 
because no limits now apply on expenditures made independently of 
candidates and political parties or contributions to entities making 
such expenditures (with the possible exception of foreign individuals 
or entities).103 It is, therefore, perhaps not surprising that the Court in 
Citizens United relied solely on the third interest—informing 
voters.104 But that single interest still left the pro-disclosure baseline 
intact.105  
Working from the historic baseline of disclosure to the FEC, a 
cost-benefit approach appears to usually be controlling and generally 
favors public disclosure of the financial support provided by 
identified individuals and entities to candidates, political parties, 
political committees, and independent expenditures.106 This may be in 
large part because the constitutionality of disclosure provisions is 
determined using the cost-benefit approach. More specifically, the 
current disclosure regime was unanimously upheld in Buckley v. 
Valeo based on the reasoning that the benefits of disclosure in the 
form of deterring corruption and the appearance of corruption, 
facilitating enforcement of other election laws, and informing voters 
generally outweighed any negative consequences of such 
disclosure.107 More recently, in Citizens United, the Supreme Court 
by an eight-to-one vote upheld disclosure rules applicable to various 
forms of election-related spending engaged in independently of 
candidates and political parties based solely on the voter information 
benefits, rejecting as a general matter the arguments that the potential 
harm—including any chilling effect on speech—from disclosure 
outweighed those benefits.108 Only Justice Thomas dissented, but he 
did not take a different approach than the majority. Rather, he differed 
with his colleagues because he viewed the likely harm from 
disclosure as substantially greater than they did.109 
The Court has also recognized that in particular circumstances 
where the costs of disclosure outweigh the benefits, an exception to 
the generally applicable disclosure rules exists as a constitutional 
matter.110 For example, in Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign 
                                                                                                                 
103 Id. at 913. 
104 Id. at 914. 
105 Id. 
106 See McGeveran, Persona, supra note 688, at 862 (detailing how recent Supreme Court 
cases in this area “represent an almost complete disregard for individual privacy interests”). 
107 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68, 81–82 (1976).  
108 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914–16. 
109 Id. at 980–82 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
110 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 71 (“There could well be a case . . . where the threat to the 
exercise of First Amendment rights is so serious and the state interest furthered by disclosure so 
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Committee, the Court found that given the extensive evidence of 
retaliatory actions taken against members and financial supporters of 
a socialist political party when their identities became known, the cost 
of disclosure to those individuals outweighed the benefits to the 
public, and so the Constitution required an exemption from the 
normally applicable disclosure rules.111 The same political party 
recently successfully petitioned the FEC for an extension of that 
exception, but only after producing extensive evidence of continuing 
retaliatory action against its members and financial supporters when 
their identities became publicly known.112 
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have proven less 
sympathetic to such claims when the retaliatory action is less 
prevalent or traceable to the public disclosure. For example, 
reviewing same-sex marriage cases, the courts have generally rejected 
attempts to keep the identities of supporters of ballot initiatives 
opposing same-sex marriage private even given evidence of scattered 
acts of retaliation ranging from boycotts and job terminations to 
criminal acts.113 Again, these decisions appear to have been driven by 
a cost-benefit analysis, with costs found wanting.114 
                                                                                                                 
 
insubstantial that the Act’s requirements cannot be constitutionally applied.”). For examples 
outside of the election law context, see, e.g., Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 
372 U.S. 539, 554–56 (1963) (holding that a legislative inquiry regarding possible members 
with Communist affiliations was not constitutional when no relationship is demonstrated 
between association and subversive or Communist activities); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 
US. 516, 523–24 (1960) (holding that the compelled disclosure to the government and public of 
the NAACP’s members was not constitutional when there exists “uncontroverted evidence” that 
members would then likely face “harassment and threats of bodily harm”); NAACP v. Alabama 
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958) (same for members of local NAACP chapters).  
111 459 U.S. 87, 101–02 (1982). 
112 See FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, ADVISORY OPINION 2009–01, at 5–9 (2009), 
available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao (reviewing the facts presented by the Socialist 
Workers Party).  
113 See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2815 (2010) (holding that disclosure of 
referendum petitions does not generally violate the First Amendment and remanding for 
consideration of whether disclosure of a petitions relating to a specific referendum would); Nat’l 
Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 765 F. Supp. 2d 38, 47–48 (D. Me. 2011) (holding that required 
registration and reporting by ballot initiative committee did not violate the First Amendment); 
ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1226 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (concluding that, 
in the context of a motion for preliminary injunction, the claim that disclosure of donors to 
ballot committees would violate the First Amendment was almost certain to fail). 
114 See, e.g., Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2819–21 (balancing the state’s interest in “preserving the 
integrity of the electoral process,” supported by evidence of past referendum petition-related 
fraud, against the lack of evidence that, in general, public identification of petition signers 
results in harassment and intimidation); Nat’l Org. for Marriage, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 53, 53 n.85 
(balancing the state’s interest in informing voters against the lack of any evidence of likely 
harassment); ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1207–11, 1216–19 (balancing the state’s 
interest in informing voters, which would be seriously burdened if disclosure was not permitted, 
against the likelihood of threats, harassment, and reprisals resulting from disclosure, which was 
very low). 
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The one significant exception is found in the McIntyre case, where 
the Court concluded that an individual who personally created flyers 
relating to a local election issue (but not a candidate) could not be 
compelled to identify herself on the flyers.115 Though the Court cited 
to the long history of anonymous political involvement in our 
country,116 it still relied in large part on a cost-benefit analysis. The 
Court ultimately concluded that since the election related to an issue, 
not a candidate, preventing corruption and the appearance of 
corruption was not at stake, and given the fact that revealing the 
relatively obscure individual’s identity would not help voters interpret 
the flyer’s message, any benefits from disclosure were minimal.117 
Mrs. McIntyre’s case was also probably aided by the fact that the 
complaint about her lack of disclosure appeared likely to have been 
made in retaliation for her political position.118 
B. A Right to Privacy 
1. In Theory 
The concept of privacy as a fundamental right is traceable to the 
view that a basic right of all individuals is a right to autonomy.119 
This view asserts that for individuals to fully be human they must be 
free to make choices.120 Anything that limits choices, therefore, 
threatens this basic aspect of what it means to be human. 
A right to privacy is necessary for autonomy because when 
otherwise private information regarding an individual’s choices is 
                                                                                                                 
115 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995). 
116 Id. at 343, 343 n.6. 
117 Id. at 348–49, 356. 
118 See id. at 338 (noting that the official who reported her supported the opposite position). 
119 See, e.g., DELANY & CAROLAN, supra note 699, at 16–20 (exploring how privacy 
enhances autonomy); RÖSSLER, supra note 70, at 116 (same with respect to informational 
privacy); Geoffrey Gomery, Whose Autonomy Matters? Reconciling the Competing Claims of 
Privacy and Freedom of Expression, 27 LEGAL STUD. 404, 408–09 (2007) (same); Kahn, supra 
note 7171, at 378 (explaining how “privacy is an attribute of individuality”); id. at 384–86 
(summarizing the relationship between privacy and autonomy); Lindsay, supra note 699, at 148 
(proposing that the moral autonomy of individuals is the basis for the deontological approach to 
privacy). A right to privacy may also be based on other more fundamental concepts, such as 
dignity, but in this context the autonomy basis is the most applicable. See SOLOVE, supra note 
699, at 85–87 (describing nonconsequentialist grounds for a right to privacy, including but not 
limited to autonomy). 
120 See, e.g., RÖSSLER, supra note 70, at 50 (“Only a life lived autonomously . . . can also 
be a rewarding life.”). An extension of this view is that privacy deserves protection not so much 
because autonomy benefits the individual but because individual autonomy ultimately benefits 
society. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY 
AND SECURITY 50 (2011) (“A society without privacy protection would be oppressive. When 
protecting individual rights, we as a society decide to hold back in order to receive the benefits 
of creating free zones for individuals to flourish.”). 
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expected to be revealed to others, an individual may alter his or her 
choices to conform to the views of others regarding the choices that 
are best.121 If this occurs, the disclosure of that individual’s otherwise 
private information reduces that individual’s autonomy. Infringement 
of privacy therefore requires a compelling justification, since such 
infringement negatively impacts a basis aspect of being human. 
There are two important refinements to this approach. First, while 
this approach supports a stronger legal right to privacy it does not 
mean that the Constitution contains such a right in all contexts. While 
the Supreme Court has identified a right to privacy in the 
Constitution, that right is a limited one.122 This constitutional right 
does not, importantly for our purpose here, reach the required 
disclosure of financial information in connection with the federal tax 
or election laws. Instead, the Court considers such disclosure under 
the exacting scrutiny analysis discussed above.123 
Second, because this right to privacy flows from an individual’s 
need for autonomy, it is a right of individuals and not of other 
entities.124 Artificial persons such as nonprofit corporations only 
enjoy the protection granted by this right to the extent necessary to 
facilitate protection of individual privacy. In other words, any privacy 
right of such artificial persons is derivative of the privacy right of 
individuals. 
2. In Practice 
This autonomy of the individual right to privacy plays a significant 
role in the disclosure rules found in the three legal regimes detailed 
above. In the federal tax regime generally, acknowledgement of that 
right leads to a strong bias against public disclosure of taxpayer 
information.125 Indeed, the bias is so strong it has been extended to 
                                                                                                                 
121 See RÖSSLER, supra note 70, at 73 (“To be able to develop authentic plans, to design or 
define oneself through one’s dealings . . ., one’s expectations with respect to other people’s 
knowledge about oneself must not be mistaken.”); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 
154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 532 (2006) (“The risk of disclosure can prevent people from engaging 
in activities that further their own self-development.”). 
122 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (sexual practices between 
consenting adults); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (abortion); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (birth control). There also is a version of the right to 
privacy under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555–
68 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (involving the use of GPS tracking by law enforcement authorities), cert. 
granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011). 
123 See supra notes 6060–622, 1077–1099 and accompanying text (discussing the exacting 
scrutiny standard). 
124 See McGeveran, Persona, supra note 688, at 881–82 (noting that “privacy theory 
focuses on individuals, not collectives”). 
125 See S. REP. NO. 94–938, at 317 (1976) (asking whether disclosure of federal tax 
information, even to other government agencies, “breaches a reasonable expectation of privacy 
 2/13/2012 3:37:51 PM 
828 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:3 
artificial entities such as for-profit corporations, as well as protecting 
the privacy of the individuals who are the vast majority of 
taxpayers.126 A recent proposal suggests, however, that there should 
be limited disclosure of tax information relating to corporations in 
part to improve tax compliance.127 While not framed in these terms, a 
relaxation of the anti-disclosure rules for artificial entities is also 
consistent with this conceptualization of a right to privacy when 
doing so does not reveal individual financial information. Such 
relaxation would be less consistent with this right-to-privacy 
approach, however, if it extended to situations when entity-level 
disclosure would be more likely to reveal individual financial 
information, as would often be the case with closely held corporations 
and other entities owned by a small group of individuals, which 
would presumably include many if not most partnerships and limited 
liability companies. 
The disclosure rules for tax-exempt nonprofit organizations also 
reveal the influence of this right-to-privacy approach in two important 
ways, even given the general pro-disclosure position of those rules. 
First, and as detailed previously, the existence of such a right is 
acknowledged but is deemed to be outweighed—or perhaps waived—
by the receipt of tax benefits by such organizations and the resulting 
need for the public to be assured that such benefits are in fact 
deserved.128 Although not generally justified in this way, disclosure is 
also consistent with the right being primarily a right for individuals, 
not artificial legal entities, since disclosure of financial and activity 
                                                                                                                 
 
on the part of the American citizen with respect to such information”); id. at 318 (citing the 
“citizen’s right to privacy” with respect to federal tax information). But see Linder, supra note 
822, at 970, 973–74 (arguing that financial information is inherently public and has little to do 
with individual autonomy, so no right to privacy should attach to such information). The right to 
privacy does not, however, prevent the IRS from gathering taxpayer financial information for its 
own use. Bittker, supra note 15, at 489 (citation omitted) (“[T]he power of the IRS to get 
information about taxpayers . . . is extremely sweeping and . . . the right of privacy plays 
virtually no role in this information-gathering process.”). 
126 When the focus is on public disclosure of information relating to entities as opposed to 
individuals, however, a right to privacy is usually not considered but instead only the cost-
benefit concerns relating to the effect of such disclosure on tax compliance. See, e.g., Blank, 
supra note 855, at 590 (discussing potential costs and benefits of “shaming sanctions” to address 
corporate tax abuse); see also Bittker, supra note 15, at 480 (“To present the conflict between 
disclosure and privacy in its sharpest form, I will limit myself to the disclosure of individual 
income tax returns; since corporate returns contain fewer personal details, disclosure would be 
less dramatic.”). 
127 Lenter, Shackelford, & Slemrod, supra note 17, at 827; see also Strauss, supra note 
822, at 31 (considering a similar proposal relating to state business tax information). 
128 See supra notes 522, 955–966 and accompanying text (discussing why the baseline for 
nonprofit organizations is pro-disclosure). 
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information for tax-exempt nonprofit organizations generally does not 
reveal financial information for identified individuals. 
Second, it is also consistent with a right-to-privacy approach that 
at least some of the areas where nonprofit organizations are not 
required to publicly disclose information involve information about 
individuals—e.g., information about donors and individual 
grantees.129 At the same time, the disclosure of information about 
private foundation donors and director, officer, and key employee 
compensation is also consistent with this approach as it is justified by 
the strong interest in the public being assured that individuals with a 
high level of influence over tax-exempt nonprofit organizations do 
not use that influence to improperly enrich themselves.130 
The right to privacy as described above plays a relatively minimal 
role in the election law context. But it has not completely escaped 
notice.131 Even here, however, the election laws are arguably 
consistent with this approach in two ways. First, the information 
disclosed about individuals involved in the political process is 
relatively limited—the amount and recipients of their contributions, 
plus the names, addresses, and employers of the contributors—as 
compared to the much more comprehensive financial information 
provided by taxpayers to the government.132 A reasonable argument 
can therefore be made that the infringement on the financial privacy 
of such individuals is relatively limited. 
Second, because the individual financial information disclosed is 
so limited, the primary effect of the existing election law disclosure 
rules is to reveal, publicly, the political leanings of the individual 
contributors. Indeed, it is this effect of such disclosures that is most 
commonly cited as infringing on the right to privacy of individuals.133 
There are, however, at least two arguments against the right to 
privacy either attaching to information about political leanings or 
controlling whether such information remains private. The first 
                                                                                                                 
129 See JCT REPORT vol. II, supra note 28, at 81 (“[D]onors have legitimate privacy 
concerns.”); supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing individual grantees). 
130 See supra notes 397–411, 100 and accompanying text (discussing private foundations 
and officers)100. 
131 See McGeveran, Persona, supra note 688, at 860 (“[S]erious attention to political 
privacy remains relatively invisible compared to areas such as health care or social media”); 
supra note 688 and accompanying text (citing commentators that have argued that the balancing 
approach, which is currently used in the election law context, is inconsistent with the right-to-
privacy approach). 
132 Compare supra note 15 and accompanying text (federal tax law filings), with supra 
note 565 and accompanying text (election law filings). 
133 See McGeveran, Persona, supra note 688, at 866 (noting but criticizing the focus on 
retaliation and chilling effects while ignoring other negative effects of disclosure in this 
context). 
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argument is that one of the natural consequences of having and acting 
on political leanings is having to defend such political leanings 
publicly.134 That is, politics is an inherently public activity because it 
is generally conducted publicly and affects the broader public. Thus, 
an individual who seeks to influence politics in a direction that they 
desire has no legitimate expectation of privacy. Any exceptions to this 
general view, such as those that currently exist with respect to voting, 
should therefore be limited to situations where the costs of public 
disclosure clearly exceed the benefits to society. 
The second, related argument is that an individual’s political 
views, if acted on, potentially affect matters that will primarily impact 
others, including possibly the entire public. Given this potential 
effect, it is the public’s business to know about an individual’s 
political actions even if that individual’s political views would 
otherwise be private. In other words, the public has a right to know 
about such actions, even if they reveal otherwise private political 
leanings. The public’s right to know trumps the contributor’s right to 
privacy similarly to the way that the public’s interest in knowing 
whether nonprofit organizations that receive significant tax benefits 
qualify for those benefits trumps any right to privacy (derivative or 
otherwise) such organizations might enjoy. Again, exceptions should 
only exist for particular situations where the costs of disclosure 
clearly outweigh the benefits. 
There is, however, a reasonable counterargument. The 
counterargument is that since the right to privacy for individuals has 
its roots in the fundamental human characteristic of autonomy, 
including autonomy with respect to political choices, it would be 
inconsistent with that origin to expose such choices to public scrutiny 
and therefore influence. That is, if an individual’s political action is 
not inherently public—as would be the case with, for example, 
making an endorsement or having a yard sign—such action should be 
protected by a right to privacy because otherwise there is significant 
risk that the individual’s autonomy will be comprised.135 This line of 
                                                                                                                 
134 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 09–
559) (Scalia, J.) (“[T]he fact is that running a democracy takes a certain amount of civic 
courage. And the First Amendment does not protect you from criticism or even nasty phone 
calls when you exercise your political rights to legislate, or to take part in the legislative 
process.”); McGeveran, Persona, supra note 688, at 867 (“[I]n the election disclosure cases, 
calls for ‘civic courage,’ characterizations of political activity as ‘lawmaking,’ and references to 
the ‘public sphere’ all endeavor to define conflict away, simply by placing involvement with 
elections on the ‘public’ side of a clear and dispositive line.”). 
135 See McGeveran, Persona, supra note 688, at 872 (“[D]onations, petition signatures, and 
party registration generally are not intended as announcements of political views to one’s 
neighbors.”); id. at 877 (“The prospect of disclosure can discourage individuals from taking 
certain political actions, and it pushes citizens toward conformity with dominant views.”). 
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reasoning suggests that not all political actions are inherently public 
and so the right to privacy applies to at least some political actions. 
And even though private political actions have public effect, that 
alone should not be sufficient to overcome the right to privacy. Part 
III considers these arguments further in the specific context of 
individuals financially supporting politically active, tax-exempt 
organizations. 
Vindicating privacy concerns therefore can be pursued in two 
strikingly different ways. The different approaches to privacy and 
disclosure in the general tax, nonprofit tax, and election law contexts 
reveals that the approach chosen can lead to a large variation in 
results. The choice made in each context may make sense in that 
context. But when the contexts intersect—as is the case when 
discussing expanding disclosure with respect to politically active, tax-
exempt nonprofits—a choice about which and to what extent each 
approach will be applied to determine the appropriate level of 
disclosure and privacy is required. To the proposals for such 
expanded disclosure and these choices we now turn. 
III. NONPROFITS, POLITICS, AND PRIVACY 
The increased attention to and amount of political spending by tax-
exempt nonprofits in the wake of Citizens United has generated a 
plethora of proposals for increasing the public disclosure of 
information about both these entities and their financial supporters. 
This Part briefly summarizes these proposals and then considers them 
from first a cost-benefit perspective and then a right-to-privacy 
perspective. Perhaps not surprisingly, the cost-benefit perspective 
generally supports such proposals with only the caveat that in some, 
relatively unusual situations, an exception might be required. The 
application of the right-to-privacy perspective is, however, more 
complicated. Because that right primarily applies to individuals, it 
does not create a barrier to public disclosure of information relating to 
the entities themselves. But with respect to information relating to 
financial supporters, many if not most of whom may be individuals or 
entities closely associated with specific individuals, the right does 
provide a ground for objecting to such public disclosure. That 
objection is only valid, however, if the right applies not only to 
financial information but also to political leanings that otherwise 
would not be publicly known. 
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A. Proposals 
While commentators and lawmakers have floated many proposals 
to increase public disclosure of information relating to politically 
active, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, these proposals can be 
grouped into essentially two categories.136 The first category is 
information relating to such organizations themselves, including their 
finances and activities. Examples of such proposals include requiring 
such entities to apply to the IRS for recognition of their tax-exempt 
status, requiring more detailed, and quicker, reporting of political 
expenditures and activities than currently exists through the generally 
required annual information return, and requiring such entities to 
report on their political activities to their members or donors.137  
The second category is information identifying significant 
financial supporters of tax-exempt nonprofit organizations.138 While 
tax-exempt nonprofits are already required to report identifying 
information for relatively large donors to the IRS as part of the annual 
information return, such information is not disclosed to the public, 
except if the donations are to a private foundation or a political 
organization.139 Current proposals would generally require that for 
other types of tax-exempt nonprofits engaged in political activity such 
information would both be made public and be submitted much more 
                                                                                                                 
136 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (citing proposals by Congress and 
commentators). 
137 See, e.g., House DISCLOSE Act, supra note 4, at § 301 (disclosure of certain political 
activities to members and donors); Senate DISCLOSE Act, supra note 4, at § 301 (same); 
Aprill, supra note 4, at 401–02 (proposing requiring an application for exemption within a 
specified period of time); Tobin, supra note 4, at 439–40 (same). 
138 See, e.g., House DISCLOSE Act, supra note 4, § 211 (disclosure of identifying 
information regarding donors to organizations engaged in certain political activities); Senate 
DISCLOSE Act, supra note 4, § 211 (proposing similar requirements); Aprill, supra note 4, at 
403–404 (disclosure of contributors to noncharitable, tax-exempt organizations); Tobin, supra 
note 4, at 440–44 (disclosure of contributors in excess of $25,000 annually); Torres-Spelliscy, 
supra note 4, at 90–91 (discussing the secretive trade association problem and proposing more 
disclosure); Callahan, supra note 4, at A21 (proposing that the IRS create a new category of 
nonprofits engaged in political activity in which entities would be forced to disclose all their 
donors). A related aspect of such proposals is required public disclosure of the recipients of 
substantial political expenditures by such organizations. See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 4, at 404–
05 (proposing to tax political activity of nonprofit, noncharitable organizations regardless of 
whether the organizations has net investment income); Tobin, supra note 4, at 440–44 
(disclosure of non-employee expenditures in excess of $25,000). Such recipients tend to be 
entities as opposed to individuals and are not generally supporting such organizations 
financially, but only exchanging goods or services for fair market value payments, so disclosure 
of their role does not necessarily reveal their political leanings. For these reasons, such 
disclosure does not raise significant issues under either a cost-benefit approach or a right to 
privacy approach and is ignored for purposes of this article.  
139 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing which organizations must 
disclose their major donors to the public). 
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quickly. And some proposals would also expand the universe of 
donors subject to disclosure. 
Whether such proposals are desirable depends in significant part 
on the approach one takes with respect to privacy. This Part therefore 
considers these categories of proposals using each of the two 
approaches discussed above. 
B. The Cost-Benefit Approach 
1. Entity Disclosure 
As discussed above, the existing rules requiring public disclosure 
of applications for recognition of exemption and annual information 
returns filed by tax-exempt nonprofit organizations are justified for 
two reasons: (1) the public’s interest in knowing whether such 
organizations qualify for these benefits; and (2) the consent of tax-
exempt organizations to disclosure as a condition for receiving tax 
benefits.140 Thus, additional or quicker disclosure of information 
relating to the subset of organizations that engage in political 
activities should only be rejected under the cost-benefit approach if 
the costs of disclosure generally outweigh the benefits. Most political 
activity by a tax-exempt nonprofit organization is a public matter in 
itself—advertisements, mailings, phone banks, and so on. And 
financial information relating to tax-exempt nonprofit organizations is 
also already public given the pro-disclosure baseline. Thus, there does 
not appear to be generally any significant costs of such additional and 
faster disclosure. 
Furthermore, additional and faster disclosure provides the benefit 
of enabling the public to better ascertain in a timely fashion whether a 
given organization in fact qualifies for the tax-exempt status they are 
claiming.141 Specifically, non-charitable tax-exempt nonprofit 
organizations that are not Internal Revenue Code section 527 political 
organizations may only engage in political activity as a secondary 
activity. Yet there have allegedly been repeated attempts to violate 
this rule in recent years.142 Thus, a clear need exists for the public to 
                                                                                                                 
140 See supra notes 522, 955–966 and accompanying text (discussing why the baseline for 
nonprofit organizations is pro-disclosure). 
141 See Tobin, supra note 4, at 439–40 (discussing the problems with the current 
application regime). 
142 See Nicholas Confessore, Watchdogs Call Out 4 Nonprofits as Too Political for Tax 
Exemption, THE CAUCUS (Sept. 28, 2011, 5:26 PM), 
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/28/watchdogs-call-out-4-nonprofits-as-too-
political-for-tax-exemption/ (discussing how several watchdog groups argue for tighter 
campaign laws that would take away tax exemptions for nonprofit groups that become too 
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have a faster way to ensure this rule is satisfied. Finally, it should be 
noted that while certain charitable nonprofits—primarily churches 
and church-related entities—are exempt from the existing filing and 
disclosure rules, those nonprofits would not be affected by these 
proposals since they are prohibited under current federal tax law from 
engaging in any activities that would support or oppose a candidate 
for elected public office.143 
Thus, under a cost-benefit approach, it appears that there are no 
plausible general objections to proposals that would require additional 
and faster disclosure of financial and political activity information for 
politically active, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations. If such 
disclosure would be problematic for a particular entity under this 
approach an exception could be considered to cover such situations. 
But especially given the public nature of most political activity, it is 
difficult to imagine a scenario where an exception would be needed. 
2. Donor Disclosure 
Currently, information regarding financial supporters of tax-
exempt nonprofit organizations is not subject to disclosure except 
with respect to private foundations and political organizations.144 The 
private foundation exception arises out of the combination of the 
control of private foundations by a single donor or small group of 
donors and deductibility of contributions that donors to private 
foundations, as section 501(c)(3) organizations, enjoy—a 
combination that does not exist and so is not relevant for non-
501(c)(3)s that are permitted to engage in political activity, albeit as 
less than a primary activity, but whose donors do not enjoy 
deductibility for their contributions.145 The reasons for the section 527 
exception are the same reasons as for the current proposals to expand 
this exception to encompass donors to other types of politically active 
tax-exempt nonprofit organizations and is considered below. 
                                                                                                                 
 
engaged in politics); Matthew Murray, IRS Scrutinizing Political Activity, ROLL CALL, Apr. 14, 
2008 (describing how the IRS is reportedly closely examining recent allegations of excessive 
political activity by section 501(c)(4), tax-exempt social welfare organizations). 
143 I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2), 501(c)(3) (2006). While “political activity” could be construed as 
including activity relating to ballot initiatives and referenda as well as candidates, the proposals 
have generally focused on candidate-related political activity. 
144 See supra note 37–41 and accompanying text (discussing private foundations and 
political organizations and the reasoning behind the different treatment in the Internal Revenue 
Code). 
145 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting the reasoning behind the private 
foundation exceptions). 
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In general, public disclosure of donor information is disfavored 
under a cost-benefit approach. While there is a baseline of complete 
public disclosure, the benefit from an exception for donors in the 
form of significantly increased donations is generally seen as 
substantially outweighing the cost, if any, to ensuring compliance 
with the requirements for being tax-exempt that the lack of such 
disclosure would generate (except in the case of private 
foundations).146 The key question, for both the proposals at issue here 
and the existing political organization donor disclosure rules, is 
therefore whether the calculus is different when the recipient 
organization is engaged in political activities. 
The benefits of donor disclosure commonly cited are some of the 
same ones that support donor disclosure under election law. They 
include increased voter information and preventing corruption and the 
appearance of corruption.147 For reasons I have developed elsewhere, 
such interests are generally only served when the amount of 
contributions by the publicly identified donor are relatively large.148 
For such significant donors, however, there is a plausible argument 
that knowing who financially supports a particular, politically active 
organization helps targets of that organization’s political 
communications interpret those communications and deters improper 
influence (and the appearance of improper influence) of public 
officials even if, as the Supreme Court held in Citizens United, such 
influence does not rise to a quid pro quo level. 
At the same time, the costs of such disclosures to the donors are 
usually relatively minimal. The financial information disclosed 
provides only a very partial picture of a donor’s financial situation, 
unlike the much more comprehensive financial information provided 
on taxpayer’s federal income tax return. As for disclosing the donor’s 
political leanings, even if those leanings were not previously known 
to the public, there is scant evidence of negative repercussions from 
                                                                                                                 
146 See supra note 999 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits donor anonymity 
creates). 
147 See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing election law). The other oft-
cited benefit of ensuring increased compliance with other laws is not a factor here. That is 
because tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations that are not Internal Revenue Code section 527 
political organizations generally only make expenditures independently of candidates and 
political parties, and under Citizens United and a subsequent FEC ruling applying that decision 
there are no longer limits on the sources or amounts of financial support for such expenditures 
(with the possible exception of few limited categories of sources). See Citizens United v. FEC, 
130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (striking down limits on independent expenditures); FED. ELECTION 
COMMISSION, ADVISORY OPINION 2010–11, at 2 (2010), available at 
http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao (finding that “soliciting and accepting unlimited 
contributions from individuals, political committees, corporations, and labor organizations for 
the purpose of making independent expenditures” was legal).  
148 Mayer, supra note 633, at 281–82. 
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the leanings becoming publicly known except in relative rare 
circumstances.149 Such rare circumstances can be accommodated by 
building in an exception mechanism similar to the one available in the 
election law context for the supporters of groups such as the Socialist 
Workers Party.150 
There are also potential costs to the organization involved in the 
form of reduced contributions because some donors will shy away 
from having their contributions—and thus their political leanings—
revealed publicly. That is a legitimate concern, but the extent to 
which donors will in fact change their behavior has not been 
demonstrated in other contexts—such as opposition to same-sex 
marriage—that have proven to be particularly controversial.151 Thus, 
the benefits already discussed appear to outweigh what at this point 
are relatively speculative costs. 
A cost-benefit approach therefore does not raise any general 
barriers to public disclosure of information regarding donors to 
politically active, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, at least if the 
donors are relatively large financial contributors. Indeed, in apparent 
recognition of the fact that disclosure is generally only beneficial if 
the donors involved have contributed substantial sums, most 
commentators who have put forward such proposals are willing to 
limit their reach to donors who give at or even above the already 
relatively high trigger amounts for currently required disclosure to the 
IRS.152 Subject to this caveat and the need for an exception 
mechanism in the rare case of demonstrated significant harassment of 
donors to certain types of groups or causes, the cost-benefit approach 
supports all of the existing disclosure proposals. 
                                                                                                                 
149 See supra note 11313 and accompanying text (citing cases dealing with disclosure of 
political leanings that found the evidence of harassment insufficient to justify an exception). But 
see McGeveran, Persona, supra note 688, at 871–79 (discussing additional costs of disclosure). 
What McGeveran lists as additional costs of disclosure I would instead identify as reasons for 
supporting the use of the right-to-privacy approach, which, for the reasons I have discussed, is 
conceptually and practically distinct from the cost-benefit approach. See supra note 733 and 
accompanying text (noting this distinction). 
150 See supra note 644 and accompanying text (discussing the Socialist Workers Party 
situation). 
151 See Mayer, supra note 633, at 277–78 (discussing the same-sex marriage evidence). 
152 Compare, e.g., Tobin, supra note 4, at 440 n.79 (setting a threshold over $25,000, but 
expressing a willingness to consider an even higher threshold), with INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
FORM 990 SCHEDULE B SCHEDULE OF CONTRIBUTORS (2010), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990ezb.pdf (requiring, as a general rule, disclosure to the IRS of 
identifying information for donors who contribute $5,000 or more annually). 
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C. The Right-to-Privacy Approach  
1. Entity Disclosure 
With respect to increased disclosure by entities of their own 
finances and activities, the right-to-privacy approach does not require 
rejection of the proposals for two reasons. First, the right to privacy is 
a right of individuals, not entities.153 Second, unlike a family business 
or a family foundation (for which disclosure of donors is already 
required for other reasons under any conditions), disclosure of 
information about politically active, tax-exempt nonprofits does not 
represent an indirect infringement on the privacy of individuals who 
financially support such organizations. Even if an organization is 
supported by a single individual or small group of individuals, neither 
the organization nor those individuals need to disclose that connection 
publicly. That in fact is one of the grounds cited for requiring 
disclosure of donor information, which I address in a moment—it is 
relatively easy for donors to maintain their anonymity in this context 
absent government compelled disclosure of their identities.154 
2. Donor Disclosure 
The situation is less clear, however, when it comes to disclosure of 
information about donors to politically active, tax-exempt nonprofit 
organizations. Many, perhaps most, donors are individuals who under 
this approach have a fundamental right to privacy. If that right to 
privacy extends to the information at issue here, then there has to be a 
relatively strong justification for setting that right aside in whole or in 
part. 
As discussed previously, publicly disclosing the identities of 
financial supporters reveals two pieces of information. First, it reveals 
information about the supporters’ financial situations, but only in a 
very partial way—again, much less comprehensive financial 
information than what is found, for example, on an individual’s 
federal income tax return. Second, it reveals information about the 
political leanings of those supporters. 
If the fundamental right to privacy applies to otherwise private 
financial information but does not extend to otherwise private 
political actions, there is a strong argument that it should not apply in 
                                                                                                                 
153 See supra note 1244 and accompanying text (discussing the theory of the right to 
privacy). 
154 See supra note 2 (citing sources that discuss the propensity of tax-exempt nonprofit 
organizations to keep their donors secret). 
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this context, or at least not apply very strongly, because of the very 
limited amount of financial information that is disclosed. Such a lack 
of application or weak application of the right to privacy would 
suggest that the cost-benefit analysis conducted above should be 
controlling, so proposals to increase disclosure of donor information 
should not be barred by this right. That is, the cost associated with 
revealing this otherwise private financial information should simply 
be included in the cost-benefit analysis. And for most donors that cost 
will be minimal or non-existent since the public can gain information 
about their general financial situations through other channels such as 
the neighborhood in which they live, the house they own, the type of 
car they drive, the job they have, and so on. 
If, however, the fundamental right to privacy extends to 
information about otherwise private political actions, then disclosure 
of contributions is much more problematic. But there are at least two 
arguments against such an extension. First, the inherent public nature 
of politics suggests that no right to privacy should attach to any 
political actions. And second, the potential public effect of all 
political actions suggests that even if a right to privacy attaches to 
some political actions, the public’s right to know about actions that 
could affect it generally outweighs the private political actor’s right to 
privacy. At the same time, however, it could be reasonably argued 
that because public disclosure of otherwise private political actions 
may cause individuals to change their choices regarding political 
actions and thus lose a portion of their autonomy, the right to privacy 
should extend to such actions.155 
Resolving this debate generally is well beyond the scope of this 
Article. But, below, I attempt to at least to resolve it as it applies to 
the specific context of proposals to disclose information about the 
individual financial supporters of politically active, tax-exempt 
organizations. In this context, it is plausible to conclude that publicly 
revealing the identities of financial supporters for politically 
controversial tax-exempt organizations, such as National Right to 
Life, the Planned Parenthood Action Council, the Human Rights 
Campaign, or the National Organization for Marriage, will cause 
some individuals to shy away from providing financial support that 
they would otherwise be willing to contribute. Indeed, such financial 
support seems similar to voting, which is intentionally kept private in 
order to preserve the ability of individual voters to vote without undue 
                                                                                                                 
155 See supra notes 119–121 and accompanying text (discussing the integral relationship 
between individual autonomy and the right to privacy).  
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influence from others.156 Thus, despite the public nature of politics, to 
say that the right to privacy simply does not attach at all to political 
actions that the actor could keep private absent government 
compelled disclosure appears to go too far.157 Furthermore, because 
donations to politically active, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations 
generally do not result in a tax benefit for the donor, it cannot be 
argued credibly that the donor has consented to disclosure in 
exchange for receiving a tax benefit.158 
That conclusion, however, only addresses the first argument 
against extending the right to privacy to financial support of 
politically active, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations. There is still 
the issue of whether the right to privacy in this context should 
generally be overcome by the public’s interest in the information 
because of the potential public effect of the financial support. It is 
important to emphasize that this comparison is not the same as the 
cost-benefit analysis conducted previously, where the demonstrable 
benefits to the public are balanced against the demonstrable costs to 
the individuals involved. Rather, under a right-to-privacy approach, it 
is assumed that the individuals involved have a right to privacy that 
can only be overcome by a similarly weighty right that would be 
sufficiently vindicated by public disclosure. 
There is undoubtedly a right in a liberal democratic framework for 
the public to know about actions that affect or are likely to affect the 
operation of government.159 Numerous government transparency laws 
are based on this right, including laws that reveal information not 
                                                                                                                 
156 See generally Allison R. Hayward, Bentham & Ballots: Tradeoffs Between Secrecy and 
Accountability in How We Vote, 26 J.L. & POL. 39, 45–55 (2010) (discussing the debates in 
England and the United States surrounding the eventual adoption of the secret ballot). 
157 See James A. Gardner, Anonymity and Democratic Citizenship, 19 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 927, 956 (2011) (considering whether anonymity in politics induces citizens to come 
closer to consensus norms of ideal democratic behavior and concluding that this determination 
is “highly variable and context-dependent”); McGeveran, Persona, supra note 688, at 872 
(arguing that since the flow of information to the public is unintended in many activities that 
have political connotations, such as giving a donation to an organization, signing petitions, or 
registering for a political party, such acts are not inherently public).  
158 While donors to charitable organizations may receive a tax benefit in the form of a 
charitable contribution deduction, such organizations are prohibited from supporting or 
opposing candidates. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (2006) (defining a “corporation, trust, or 
community chest, fund, or foundation” to which a donor can donate and take a charitable 
contribution deduction to exclude any organization that “attempt[s] to . . . participate in, or 
intervene in . . ., any political campaign on behalf of (or in position to) any candidate for public 
office”). 
159 See, e.g., JOHN ADAMS, A DISSERTATION ON THE CANON AND FEUDAL LAW (1765) 
reprinted in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 3, 13 (George W. Carey ed., 2000) 
(“[T]he people . . . have a right, an indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible, divine right to that 
most dreaded and envied kind of knowledge, I mean, of the characters and conduct of their 
rulers.”). 
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only about government actors but also about those who interact with 
government actors in a way that might influence their actions, such as 
lobbyists, contractors, and, of course, campaign contributors.160 Thus, 
the key question is not whether such a right exists. Rather, it is 
whether the public’s right to know is sufficiently vindicated by public 
disclosure of information about the individual financial supporters of 
politically active, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations to overcome the 
donors’ right to privacy. 
Whether the public’s right to know is vindicated by disclosure 
does not depend on whether the knowledge revealed will be used by 
the public—an issue that is considered under the cost-benefit 
approach—because that is the public’s choice. Instead, the question 
depends on whether the knowledge revealed actually relates to actions 
that influence or are likely to influence ultimate government action. 
Additionally, the scale of the knowledge revealed should at least 
roughly match the scale at which such influence is likely to occur. 
Compare, for example, a single individual’s action, which is highly 
unlikely to actually influence government action, and a large group of 
individual’s action, which is likely to have such influence. The 
public’s right to know is vindicated by public disclosure of 
information relating to the group. But public disclosure of 
information relating to the single, by themselves inconsequential, 
individual, does not vindicate any right to know because it will not 
influence the government in any way. 
Most financial supporters of politically active, tax-exempt 
nonprofit organizations provide only modest support both in absolute 
terms and relative to the overall finances of the supported 
organization. Thus, the right-to-privacy approach suggests that the 
public disclosure of individual information about most financial 
supporters will not sufficiently vindicate the public’s right to know so 
as to justify overriding the supporters’ right to privacy. Of course if 
they support the organization in other, more influential ways—such 
as serving on the organization’s board of directors or as an officer of 
the organization—then the public’s right to know would appear to 
trump the right to privacy of those individuals, but such information 
is generally already publicly disclosed.161 With respect to supporters 
                                                                                                                 
160 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 788, at xii (describing “[r]ight-to-know” laws that apply to 
governments as a “cornerstone of democratic governance”); David A. Anderson, The Failure of 
American Privacy Law, in PROTECTING PRIVACY 139, 140 (Basil S. Markesinis, ed. 1999) (“We 
expect government to conduct its business publicly, even if that infringes the privacy of those 
caught up in the matter.”). 
161 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 990, at Part VII (2010), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf (providing a section for an organization to list its 
current officers, directors, trustees, key employees, and highest compensated employees). 
 2/13/2012 3:37:51 PM 
2012] NONPROFITS, POLITICS, AND PRIVACY 841 
who provide only financial support, however, the public’s right to 
know would only be vindicated when those supporters provide a 
substantial amount of support in either absolute or relative terms such 
that the organization’s influence—which is what presumably then 
may influence government action that affects the public—to a 
significant extent reflects the supporter’s influence. 
The right-to-privacy approach leads to a similar place as the cost-
benefit approach, but arguably for more compelling reasons. Public 
disclosure of information about individual financial supporters of 
politically active, tax-exempt organizations is only justified when the 
financial support provided by a given individual (or perhaps group of 
closely related individuals) is substantial enough that it effectively 
gives that individual the ability to influence government actions 
through the operation of the recipient organization. An example of 
such a situation would be when a single wealthy individual funds an 
organization. But other, less extreme examples could exist. For 
example, the government could set a threshold dollar amount or a 
threshold percentage of the recipient organization’s annual revenues 
that the contribution would have to exceed. The selection of these 
thresholds would necessarily be somewhat arbitrary. But the selection 
of both should recognize that the public’s right to know depends on 
the actual likelihood of influence over government action. And to 
adequately protect financial supporters’ right to privacy, the dollar 
threshold should be significantly higher than the current disclosure to 
the IRS threshold of $5,000.162 While almost certainly not based on 
this reasoning, at least some commentators who have proposed 
disclosure rules have put forward higher thresholds that are consistent 
with this approach.163 Furthermore, because the right to privacy is 
primarily an individual right and only derivatively of entities, a lower 
threshold could be adopted for entities that make donations to 
politically active, tax-exempt nonprofits.164 
That if the cost-benefit approach relied on almost exclusively in 
the election law context is applied to the current proposals for 
disclosure of information relating to politically tax-exempt nonprofit 
                                                                                                                 
162 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 990 SCHEDULE B SCHEDULE OF CONTRIBUTORS 
(2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990ezb.pdf. 
163 See, e.g., Tobin, supra note 4, at 440 n.79 (proposing a threshold of $25,000 and noting 
that there is a possibility that the amount should be set even higher); see also Justin Levitt, 
Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217, 227 (2010) 
(proposing a “‘Democracy Facts’ disclaimer” on political communications that would list the 
five largest contributors to the group paying for the communication). 
164 This would also be desirable from an enforcement perspective. Otherwise multiple 
entities could be used as conduits by a single individual donor to avoid reaching the disclosure 
threshold. 
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organizations, such proposals fair relatively well is not coincidental. 
After all, that approach has tended to support the existing election law 
disclosure rules even among otherwise skeptics of campaign finance 
laws. If, however, the right-to-privacy approach used in the general 
tax context is extended to this context, the results become somewhat 
more muddied. While the latter approach does not undermine 
proposals for disclosure of the finances and activities of the 
organizations themselves, it at least raises questions about proposals 
that would reveal the political leanings of individual financial 
supporters of those organizations. If the right to privacy extends to 
those political leanings—granted, a debatable point—then a more 
compelling case for disclosure is required. A case can be made by 
invoking the public’s right to know about individual actions that are 
likely to influence government actions that affect the public. But even 
then the case is only valid when the disclosure is limited to individual 
financial supporters whose level of support in either absolute or 
relative terms is likely to permit them to influence the supported 
organization and, as a consequence, the government’s actions. 
CONCLUSION 
Favoring ever-increasing disclosure of information relating to the 
highly public and influential sphere of activity that is politics is 
understandably easy. In most instances such favor is justified. Yet at 
some point that disclosure must have a limit, at least if we accept that 
disclosure can both have real costs for those whose information is 
disclosed and that individuals enjoy a fundamental although not 
unlimited right to privacy. 
Exploring these limits in the context of federal tax law generally, 
federal tax law as it applies to tax-exempt organizations, and federal 
election law reveals the operation of two significantly different 
approaches to disclosure and privacy that have long been known to 
privacy scholars. Consideration of both a cost-benefit approach and a 
right-to-privacy approach is necessary to ensure that those whose 
privacy is infringed are sufficiently protected, especially when 
considering new disclosure rules. The current debate over the extent 
to which information about the activities and financial supporters of 
politically active, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations should be 
disclosed is one example of an area where both approaches should be 
applied.  
Consideration of the disclosure proposals reveals, not surprisingly, 
that under the cost-benefit approach, which tends to drive the federal 
election law, the new disclosure provisions are favored, both with 
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respect to the nonprofit organizations involved and their financial 
supporters. While the cost-benefit case for disclosure is perhaps less 
compelling for entities and individuals who provide relatively modest 
financial support, this approach reveals little ground for objecting to 
disclosure except in the relatively rare case of demonstrated and 
significant retaliation or other concrete costs. 
The right-to-privacy approach, which has more influence in the tax 
area, also generally supports the disclosure proposals with one major 
caveat. When those proposals relate to individual financial supporters, 
they are only justified if they are limited to the individuals who 
provide the largest levels of financial support such that their influence 
over the recipient organization is likely sufficient to cause the 
organization’s attempts to influence government action to 
significantly reflect the individual supporter’s influence. This latter 
approach, which is generally not considered in the federal election 
law context, supports greater caution when considering disclosure 
relating to individual financial supporters than the cost-benefit 
approach would likely require. If for no other reason, consideration of 
the right-to-privacy approach is important to ensure that in the zeal to 
uncover possible undue or improper influence in the political sphere, 
we as a society do not unnecessarily and improperly infringe on the 
privacy and therefore the autonomy of individuals. 
Laura Chisolm brought to the relatively new area of nonprofit law 
a commitment to deeper thought and consideration of the reasons for 
which that law exists and whether that law in its then current form 
matched those reasons, particularly as it related to political 
involvement. It is an honor to have had this opportunity to follow in 
her footsteps with respect to the relatively narrow but important issue 
of the extent to which the government should compel public 
disclosure of information relating to politically involved nonprofits. 
While I know this brief consideration does not match her work either 
in its thoroughness or insight, I offer it in memory of her many 
contributions as a scholar, teacher, and friend. 
 
